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ABSTRACT:  As patent protection has emerged to protect software, courts 
and commentators have mistakenly focused on copyright law and overlooked 
the centrality of patent preemption to limit contract law where a mass 
market license which prohibits reverse engineering (RE) for purposes of 
developing interoperable products leads to patent-like protection.  Review of 
copyright fair use cases on RE and Congress’s policy favoring RE for 
interoperability purposes in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act reinforce 
the case for patent preemption.  Also, the fundamental freedom to RE 
embodied in state trade secret law, coupled with federal patent and 
copyright law and policies, cumulatively should override a  contract barrier 
on RE based upon the public policy exception to contract enforcement.  If 
courts fail to consider patent and public policy limits on contract, the 
anomalous result is potential outsourcing of interoperability development to 
one of the increasing number of foreign jurisdictions where interoperability 
policy overrides contract law.  Ironically, that would harm the U.S. economy 
and thereby frustrate the purpose of the Intellectual Property Clause of the 
Constitution.  Finally, the patent preemption/public policy invalidation 
approach to mass market contracts outlined in this article may also provide 
a new lens whenever a mass market contract results in a de-facto monopoly 
on useful data. 
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Part I.  Introduction 
 
Have you ever wondered why there are a limited number of products that can 
work with Apple iTunes?  For example, might you like to have more options on what cell 
phones are compatible with iTunes or possibly buy something other than an iPod for 
downloading music from iTunes? 
One potential obstacle to such a world arguably is Apple’s attempt to use contract 
law to prevent competitors from reverse engineering (RE) Apple’s software to discover 
3and use the information which is needed for developing a product which can interoperate 
with the iTunes platform (“interoperability information” or IO).  Section 2 of the iTunes 
license provides:   
. . . Except as and only to the extent expressly permitted in this License or 
by applicable law, you may not copy, decompile, reverse engineer, 
disassemble, modify, or create derivative works of the Apple Software or 
any part thereof. . . .2
The question arises whenever a technology provider such as Apple relies on 
contract law to maintain a closed system, whether it be for game3, music4, instant 
messaging5, personal computer or general telecommunications software.6 Should the 
original technology provider be able to maintain a closed business model through the use 
of a contract term7 that prohibits other participants from RE products to learn the 
interfaces and protocols necessary to interoperate with the platform or utilize a file 
format?  Consumers may benefit from (1) alternative products which can work with a 
preexisting platform, such as additional games or applications which can run on a closed 
platform (e.g. having a choice of whether to buy an iPod or some other device that can 
interoperate with the iTunes platform), (2) the ability to use existing games, other 
applications software, or formatted data on an additional platform8 or (3) extended 
functionality of an existing data format or communication protocols.   Competitors may 
benefit from being able to develop and market products that interoperate with the original 
 
2 Apple Computer, Inc. iTunes Software License Agreement, available at 
http://www.apple.com/legal/sla/itunes.html (last visited  January 16, 2006). 
3 See, e.g., Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005), discussed infra at Part III.D. 
4 See, for example, Real Network’s attempt to introduce software compatible with Apple iTunes.  See also 
infra Part V.C. 
5 Consider, for example, the closed world of AOL instant messaging.  Wouldn’t it be great if you could 
share buddy lists and communicate amongst AOL, Yahoo and MSN instant messaging programs?  Alas, 
arguably one obstacle to such a world is AOL’s reliance on a contract term prohibiting RE to prevent others 
from discovery and use of the IO needed to make this a reality.  See Alexandra Krasne, A truce in the 
instant-messaging wars? (August 24, 1999)(stating that “AOL accused Microsoft of illegally hacking into 
its AOL Instant Messenger system to ensure interoperability.”), available at 
http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9908/24/truce.idg/ (last visited February 17, 2006). 
6 See, e.g., Alcatel U.S.A., Inc. v. DGI Techs., 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999), discussed infra, text 
accompanying notes 232-34.   
7 The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (as amended 1996), 18 U.S.C. §1030 (2001), may provide 
yet another means in the network environment for a closed technologist to attempt to enforce a closed 
technology model.  Discussion of this statute is beyond the scope of this paper, but will be discussed in a 
forthcoming article.  However, arguably courts should construe that statute to be consistent with patent and 
trade secret laws and policies discussed in this Article to avoid arguable section 1030 claims.  It is 
interesting to note that Congress did consider this in enacting section 1201 of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. §1201 (2001), and did not require compliance with that act to be able to 
reverse engineer for IO purposes under section 1201(f)(1)-(2).  See generally infra, Part IV.B. 
8 See, e.g., Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005), discussed infra, Part III.D; See also 
DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th 864 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2003), discussed infra text 
accompanying notes 154-59. 
4technology.  The question is whether these interests should outweigh the interests of the 
original technology provider.9
Courts increasingly are enforcing RE terms such as Apple’s as a matter of 
contract law and notwithstanding arguments of copyright preemption.10 Recently, the 
Eighth and Federal Circuits applying California and Massachusetts law have enforced 
mass market license terms which preclude RE, and the Seventh Circuit decision in 
ProCD v. Zeidenberg11 may be interpreted to preclude discovery and use of IO to 
develop an independent interoperable program.12 The net result is that a closed 
technologist may forego a limited patent term in favor of state contract law as an 
effective instrument to foreclose discovery and use of IO.     
This article posits that a non-negotiated mass market license term should be 
unenforceable to the extent it is interpreted to bar RE of IO and thereby creates patent-
like rights to IO under the guise of state contract law.   Two distinct but related rules 
require invalidation of such a license term:  (1) patent preemption; and (2) the public 
policy exception to contract enforcement.  The same reason lies at the heart of application 
of both rules:  the fundamental right to reverse engineer a publicly available product is 
subverted by such non-negotiated clauses and Congress and the courts have consistently 
affirmed the importance of interoperability in the computer and telecommunications 
industries and the centrality of patent law in the area of protection of functional IO.   
This article also suggests why courts and commentators have mistakenly focused 
on copyright and contract law, rather than patent and trade secret law (and the interplay 
among all four sources of law), in considering this issue.  In sum, the enforceability 
debate arose at a time when contract, trade secrets and copyright were the primary 
theories for protection of software and serious doubt existed about the viability of patent 
law.13 Now that patent is becoming an increasingly central form of legal protection of 
 
9 Academics have studied this question and deemed IO to be of paramount interest.  See generally, Pamela 
Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 Yale L.J. 1575 
(2002) (providing overview of the topic).  In addition, antitrust law has required compulsory licensing of 
IO.  See, for example, the Microsoft antitrust settlement, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f9400/9495.htm (last visited 2/16/06). 
10 See cases discussed infra, Part III.D.  Interestingly, it is typically when fundamental issues are foreclosed 
by a mass market license, such as access to judicial redress, courts have found ways to avoid enforcement.  
See, e.g,, Specht v. Netscape Communs. Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2002).  As discussed in this article, 
fundamental patent, copyright and trade secret policies are implicated by a mass market license term which 
bars RE to discover IO. 
11 86 F.3d 1447 (1996). 
12 See cases discussed infra Part III.D. 
13 Arguably for that reason, there has been scant analysis of the issue by careful study of  patent and trade 
secret law.  Ironically, there was early discussion generally of patent preemption.  See, e.g., Steven W. 
Lundberg & John P. Sumner, Patent Preemption of Shrink-Wrap Prohibitions on Reverse Engineering,
COMPUTER LAW., Apr. 1987, at 9; Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property Protection and Reverse 
Engineering of Computer Programs in the United States and the European Community, 8 HIGH TECH. L.J. 
25, 91-99 & n.339 (1993) (none of these authors focused on the five-factor test suggested in this Article).  
See also commentators listed infra, note 108. 
5software,14 it is critical to consider enforceability from the lens of the balance the 
Supreme Court has adopted on the appropriate role for state regulation of functional 
information such as IO (patentable subject matter) without impermissibly clashing with 
patent law. 
Viewed from this perspective, an analysis of Supreme Court decisions on patent 
preemption of state trade secret and other IP laws strongly supports preemption of mass 
market terms which prohibit RE solely for purposes of discovery and use of IO to 
develop an independent interoperable product.  This conclusion is based on two 
assertions.  First, the effect of enforcement of such terms is the creation of a form of state 
IP protection which may be stronger, not weaker, than patent law.  Second, enforcement 
of such contract terms alters the delicate balance between federal and state regulation of 
discovery and use of compatibility information.  It is precisely such regulatory 
competition concerning IP that the Supreme Court has consistently rejected by applying 
patent preemption. 
 
Courts have also not been presented with detailed analysis of the inherent tension 
between enforcing a non-negotiated mass market license prohibition on RE and the 
fundamental policy of trade secret law (founded on the importance of encouraging rather 
than stifling competition in the marketplace) that it is lawful for a party to RE a publicly 
available product.  Properly presented, there is a compelling case that the basic contract 
principle that terms contrary to public policy are unenforceable should invalidate such a 
term solely to the extent that it prevents discovery and use of the information necessary 
for a developer to make an independent interoperable. 
 
This article posits a way for courts to overcome the patent preemption risk by 
careful consideration of patent, copyright and trade secret law to appropriately interpret 
or, when necessary, invalidate, as a matter of state contract public policy analysis, 
contract terms restricting RE for purposes of interoperability.  Thus by use of the tools of 
contract interpretation,  public policy, or patent preemption (solely as a last resort), 
courts should hold that a mass market license restriction cannot prevent RE software 
solely for purposes of discovery and use of IO.
Ironically, if courts do not undertake such an analysis, the result is to incent IO 
developers to outsource such activities to one of the increasing number of key 
jurisdictions where interoperability policy outweighs contract enforcement.  That would 
frustrate, rather than further, the underlying purpose of the Intellectual Property Clause of 
the Constitution to foster within the United States “the introduction of new products and 
processes of manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased 
employment and better lives for our citizens.”15 
14 Bradford L. Smith & Susan O. Mann, Innovation and Intellectual Property Protection in the Software 
Industry: An Emerging Role for Patents?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 241, 242 (2004). 
 
15 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974). 
6Part II. Background 
 
A. Evolution of Legal Protection and Distribution of Software to 
License as Part of the Software 
 
A brief review of the evolution of the legal protection of software and related 
changes in the method for distributing software is critical to analyzing a non-negotiated 
mass market license restriction on RE for purposes of developing an interoperable 
product.   
 
Ever since software gained prominence in the marketplace, debates have raged 
over the proper legal bases for protection.  Early on, doubt existed about both copyright 
and patent protection.16 As such, software creators have always relied heavily on 
contract law and trade secret law to protect their efforts.17 
In the mid 20th century, software was but a part of a large, multi-faceted 
transaction subject to an individually negotiated written contract which was physically 
separate from the mainframe computer in which the software inhered.  Initially doubts 
existed about copyright and patent protection, so contract and trade secret were the only 
firm anchors for protection.  In 2006, software is now often distributed electronically and 
regardless of whether it is distributed in a tangible medium or not, the license is a part of 
the software code and that code may be protected by contract, trade secret, copyright, and 
patent law.18 
The first phase of software distribution was the mainframe computer world of 
IBM and a few others.19 Starting in the middle of the 20th century, IBM led the way in 
selling integrated computing packages to large customers.  The package included a 
mainframe computer, software and a service agreement by IBM to maintain and repair 
the hardware and incidental software.  Physically separate, but all important, was the 
contract for this often multi-million dollar transaction.  The contract was often pamphlet-
like in size and was individually negotiated between IBM and a single customer.  This 
multi-sheet contract included a license to the software.  These sheets of paper were 
physically separate from the hardware in which the software resided.  In this phase the 
model was often sale of the computer hardware (in which the software inhered) and 
license of the IP rights in the software.  The software was included in the hardware and 
was distributed in machine readable (binary code) form.  One term in the contract 
prohibited RE of the software.  Since only individually negotiated contracts were 
 
16 See generally Smith & Mann, supra note 14 (outlining phases in the legal protection of software). 
17 See id.at 243.  See also, Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 
SOUTHERN CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1242-44 (1995). 
18 In addition, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, as amended, 18 U.S.C. §1030 (2001), has 
potential as a very broad form of protection for any information (whether protectable by IP or not) for any 
software or data solely available on a computer—clearly an increasingly central method by which software 
is made available.  This Act will be part of a forthcoming article generally on limits to access and use of 
information in the digital network environment (working title, “The Sleeping Giant of Data Protection 
Awakens:  The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act”). 
19 See generally Smith & Mann, supra note 14, at 243-47. 
7involved, there was no question about the enforceability of such a term because it solely 
affected the party who negotiated the term, and did not affect the right of the public at 
large.  Initially, only contract and trade secret law unquestionably protected the software.   
 
Commencing in the 1970s, the second phase20 of distribution occurred with the 
advent of the personal computer and disaggregation of the distribution of software from 
hardware. 21 It was at this juncture that paper contracts solely governing license of the 
software gained significance.   
 
During this period, the key legal debate was whether copyright or some sui 
generis form of protection or patent law should be available to protect software.22 Some 
of the concerns raised were that software is functional and accordingly did not fit well 
under copyright law.23 Nonetheless, ever since the 1960s, software has been 
copyrightable.24 In the decades since that time, the courts have addressed questions about 
the scope of protection that copyright affords to software, particularly with an eye to 
ensuring that functionality was not monopolized under the guise of copyright.25 
The third phase unfolded in the 1980s with mass market adoption of the PC and 
the resulting flood of separate software available for use.  At this time, doubt remained 
about whether software was patentable.26 The PC revolution unleashed a new 
distribution model for software – the shrink wrap license (or “mass market” license or 
 
20 See id. at 244-45. 
21 This disaggregation forced the debate about respect for and remuneration for the software itself.  See 
William Henry Gates III, Letter to Hobbyists (February 3, 1976) (wherein Bill Gates pleaded with people 
using (i.e. copying) MicroSoft’s software to pay for such copies, rather than “stealing” it, or else risk the 
development of software for the emerging “hobbyist” market for the emerging PC.  Thus, he asked, “Will 
quality software be written for the hobby market?”).  See 
http://www.blinkenlights.com/classiccmp/gateswhine.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2006).  Had users not 
ultimately responded to this model change, the software industry as we know it would not exist.  Ironically, 
we are returning to this issue once again with the rise of the Open Source Movement.  See infra note 32.  
Interestingly, there are some analogies between the free riders of software in the 1970s and the free riders 
of music using file sharing technology at the turn of the 21st Century.  Arguably in the case of music use by 
file sharing, the combined effects of new business models such as Apple iTunes and the Supreme Court 
decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005), are leading to a whole 
new industry.  Ironically, how competitive this new field will be may be effected by whether courts 
consider the approach suggested in this Article.  See Part V.C. 
22 This debate culminated in the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works 
(CONTU), Final Report (Library of Congress 1979).  See also, Lemley, supra note 17. 
23 See  Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer 
Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663 (1984)(outlining concerns raised by 
dissenting CONTU Commissioner John Hershey who argued that copyright should not “extend to a 
computer program in the form in which it is capable of being used to control computer programs.”).  See 
also, CONTU Report, id. at 66-69 (concurring opinion of Commissioner Melville Nimmer suggests that 
“copyright might be stretched to the breaking point if applied to software” (quoting Robert W. 
Gomulkiewicz, Legal Protection for Software: Still a Work in Progress, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 445, 
447 n. 6 (2002)). 
24 See  Smith & Mann, supra note 14, at 243-44. 
25 See e.g., Computer Assocs. Int’l Inc. v. Altai Inc., 23 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1992) and discussion 
infra Part IV.A. 
26 See  Smith & Mann, supra note 14, at 253 and 244 n. 7. 
8contract).  The distribution model involved the vendor making a copy of the software 
code onto a diskette, and then placing the diskette in a box along with a sheet of paper on 
which the license terms were printed.  The box was closed and shrink-wrapped in 
cellophane.  Early on, there was often no indication on the box informing consumers 
what type of transaction was involved, but over time software vendors began including 
standard language on the box to notify the “purchaser” (a misnomer unless viewed as 
purchaser of a “license”) that a “license” was enclosed. That contract provided that the 
storage medium was not in fact sold, but rather licensed to the user, along with a license 
of the IP rights (typically copyright, now potentially patent) to use the program.  In 
addition, the program was distributed in machine readable object code to preserve trade 
secrecy of the source code.   
 
This new distribution model had 3 key attributes which were founded in contract 
law (1) to license (not sell) a tangible storage medium;27 (2) to distribute code in machine 
readable binary code (and thus preserve trade secrecy in the source code); and (3) to 
license the intangible IP (typically copyright, now potentially patents too) which inhered 
in the storage medium (the copy license/binary distribution/IP license model).  By virtue 
of this copy license/binary distribution/IP license model, software makers sought to rely 
on contract to avoid the limitations imposed by the law from the sale of a particular 
article in which IP rights inhere.28 The net effect of this copy license/binary 
distribution/IP license model has been to enable the software “vendor” (an interesting 
misnomer) to rely on contract (coupled with any other IP rights in software) to maintain 
greater control over the software than permissible solely by copyright law, patent law or 
trade secret law where an article is actually sold, rather than merely leased or licensed.29 
As the software industry evolved in the 1980s, contract law thus was critical to 
enable software makers to reap a return for their research, development and marketing 
efforts, particularly in an era of uncertainty about the scope of copyright protection and 
 
27 It is this issue which has led to the enormous debate over whether the copy of the software whose 
possession is transferred under a mass market software license involves a sale of goods or a license of a 
copy.  See Lemley, supra at note 17, at n. 23 (describing the debate over the “fictional” status of a 
shrinkwrap license and including authorities finding that the transaction involved a sale of goods).  See also,
Steven A. Heath, Contracts, Copyright, and Confusion Revisiting the Enforceability of ‘Shrinkwrap’ 
Licenses, 5 CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELLECTUAL PROP. 12, 20-22 (2005)(discussing recent cases on the 
“elusive nature of the software license”). 
 
28 See Lemley supra note 17 at 1244-45 (“Software vendors needed proof that they were not in fact 
disclosing their trade secrets by selling copies to whomever wanted them.  To provide such proof, they 
created the legal fiction that they were really licensing rather than selling their software.  Because the 
‘license’ contained provisions that required customers to keep the software confidential, the trade secrets 
contained therein could be protected.”) 
29 Interestingly the use of a distribution model in which the technologists seek to avoid a sale is not unique 
to software.  Professor Sean O’Connor has noted that AT&T used this model in leasing, rather than selling, 
telephones to customers of the AT&T service.  It was not until the antitrust settlement with the U.S. 
government that the consumer was provided the option of actually purchasing the phone. In addition, with 
the 1990 amendment of the Copyright Act to include a rental right which attaches to software, the mere fact 
that software is sold does not extinguish all rights to control distribution of a copy.  See infra text 
accompanying note 35.  This helps to focus the key issue on protection of the secret information (not 
copyrightable expression) which inheres in the code. 
9serious doubt about the existence of any patent protection.30 One key term in the typical 
mass market license both then and now is a prohibition on RE, such as disassembling or 
decompiling the machine readable code to discover the trade secret source code for the 
program, which can include information necessary to develop a program that can be 
compatible or interoperate with the software.  In essence, software makers have used 
contract law as a means to protect the valuable trade secrets which inhere in a program. 
 
With the widespread adoption by the software industry of mass market licenses in 
the 1980s, a debate ensued about the enforceability of this new form of licensing and 
distribution model.31 At the time courts first began to address this issue, uncertainty 
remained about patent protection for software but that doubt had already been resolved 
for copyright.  Consequently it is not surprising that a key argument presented to courts 
beyond basic contract principles (such as assent, adhesion and unconscionability) was 
whether certain aspects of mass market licenses are preempted by copyright law. 
 
The fourth phase occurred in the 1990s when the license became part of the 
software code.32 Software vendors began to include the license as part of the software 
code in addition to placing a printed copy of the license in the box.  Vendors coded 
programs so that a user first had to read and agree to the terms of the license before any 
access to the program was permissible.  This phase is significant because it resulted in a 
practical impossibility for a person to lawfully acquire a copy of the software separate 
from the license. 
 
The debate over enforceability continued in the 1990s but courts increasingly 
ruled that mass market licenses were generally enforceable.33 In addition it became clear 
that patent law protected software inventions. 34 Congress also amended the Copyright 
Act in 1990 to extend the distribution right for copyright owners of general purpose 
software to include rental and leasing of copies, notwithstanding any sale of those 
particular copies.35 
30 See, e.g., Smith & Mann, supra note 14, at 241 (noting the “important impact [of IP laws] on the 
software industry’s success”). 
31 See Lemley, supra note 17, at n. 107 (listing commentators arguing that shrink-wrap licenses were 
unenforceable).  See also Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious About User-Friendly Mass Market 
Licensing for Software, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 687, 687 nn. 3-5 (2004) (summarizing the debate and 
some of the participants). 
32 Another significant development which emerged in the 1990s (and which is now reverberating through 
the industry) was the open source movement.  Under this approach, source code is published and 
distributed—as such the software developer foregoes any trade secret rights in the software.  Interestingly, 
the “copyleft” part of this movement in fact is critically dependent upon license terms in an effort to 
circumscribe the right of licensees from asserting copyright and patent rights.  As such the copyleft General 
Public License presents issues of potential misuse of copyright and patent which are beyond the scope of 
this article, but it is yet another example where it is critical to scrutinize whether a license is being used in a 
fashion consistent with all areas of IP law.    
33 See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 31, 688 n.7. 
34 See Smith & Mann, supra note 14, at 242 (“patent protection may emerge as a critical form of IP 
protection for software”). 
35 Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990, title VIII of the Judicial Improvements Act of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat 5089, 5134, enacted December 1, 1990. One final largely unnoticed 
development was the 1996 amendment of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to cover “any protected 
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The fifth phase is currently occurring:  the transition from tangible distribution to 
software solely available electronically via the internet.  Electronic availability36 simply 
reinforces what occurred at the fourth phase—the license is solely the code.  It is made 
abundantly clear by the fact that there is no sheet of paper anymore, unless the end user 
decides (perhaps at the vendor’s suggestion) to print a copy herself.  This phase also has 
involved some transformation from distribution of software to providing a service of 
accessing software resident on a provider’s server. 
 
The last development in cementing the transformation of the license to code is 
Congress’s enactment of sections 1201 and 1202 of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act of 1998.37 The purpose of these sections is to address electronic distribution of 
copyrighted works.  Section 1201 effectively prevents reverse engineering of a 
technological measure employed to protect a work.  Section 1202 makes it unlawful to 
separate the license from the copyrighted work.  As such the copyrighted work and 
license merge. 
 
The distribution of software has evolved to the point that the license is now 
typically part of the copyrighted code and any attempt to separate the license from the 
rest of the code constitutes a violation of federal (and international)38 law.  The 
significance of this evolution is that in 2006 there may no longer be any practical way to 
lawfully obtain the code without the license terms.  There are no strangers who may 
legally acquire software as a product in the marketplace free of a contractual term 
prohibiting RE.39 
This evolution to license as part of the software code is significant in light of the 
Supreme Court’s test for determining whether state protection of IP is preempted by 
 
computer” used in interstate or foreign commerce.  The massive ramifications of this statute on the 
protection of information (regardless of its copyrightability or patentability) have just begun to unfold in a 
world where data is increasingly available primarily by a computer server accessible via the internet.  See 
e.g.,  Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F.Supp.2d 238, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 1957 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d, 356 
F.3d 393 (2nd Cir. 2004).  See also, supra note 18. 
36 “Availability” is used because different models have emerged for software:  electronic distribution and 
“software as service”.  The latter may comport better with notions of enjoying a performance or display of 
some intellectual creation, rather than distribution of copies.  The 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty recognized 
that availability would be increasingly important when it established a right to make available a work under 
Article 8 (the “Right of Communication to the Public”) of the Treaty.  
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html#P78_9739 (last visited January 16, 2006). 
37 17 U.S.C. §1201-2 (2001). 
38 See art. 6, World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty 1996. 
39 Of course regardless of how one acquires an article in which copyright and patent rights inhere, the mere 
fact that no contract terms control or restrict use does not absolve the possessor of the article of any rights 
which might be asserted by a copyright or patent owner.  See e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 
1574 (7th Cir. 1996) (“federal copyright laws of their own force would limit the finder’s ability to copy or 
transmit the application program.”).  The point of the text above is that due to the fact that the license is 
part of the code and one cannot access the code without first accessing the license, it is hard to see how one 
could attain a status equivalent of say a holder in due course who takes free of any prior claims to a 
negotiable instrument.  My thanks to Professor Sean O’Connor for raising the analogy of the law of 
negotiable instruments. See also discussion infra, text at notes 189-201. 
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patent law.  Although it is now clear that patent law can protect methods by which a 
computer program interoperates with other programs and hardware,40 there has been 
surprisingly little attention focused specifically on the barrier a mass market license 
restriction on RE places on the discovery and use of trade secret IO necessary to develop 
an interoperable program and the implications of enforcement of such terms on patent 
and trade secret law.41 
Due to the timing of legal developments and changes in the distribution model for 
software, two issues have not received adequate focus.  First, since prohibiting RE has 
always been a contract term, minimal attention has been given to the implication of a 
mass market  license term on the fundamental trade secret law principle of the freedom to 
RE a publicly available product.  Second, since it is only recently that patent law has 
gained prominence in protecting software, scant attention has been given to the interplay 
between patent and contract law. 
 
B. Reverse Engineering of Software42 
RE is nothing new.  For centuries individuals have acquired competitors’ products 
in the marketplace, disassembled them to understand how they worked, and copied them 
to build competitive products.  Where no IP rights inhere in a particular product, the well 
accepted principle is that any person can buy the product and thereafter RE it (i.e. 
disassemble and study the product) to copy features and build a competitive product.43 
In the computer industry context, RE may be undertaken for cloning purposes.  A 
competitor may seek to RE a product in order to clone it.  Here, the competitor simply 
wants to copy the product (including all its functionality and methods of operation) in its 
entirety.  If an original developer elects to preserve the secrecy of source code 
information for software, then the ability to RE the software is extremely helpful to a 
competitor in understanding the method of operation and other details contained in the 
source code for the targeted program. 44 In this case, it is possible for the competitor to 
 
40 See e.g., United States Patent No. 6,968,438 issued November 22, 2005( Application programming 
interface with inverted memory protocol for embedded software systems.”) (Texas Instruments Inc., 
assignee); United States Patent No. 6,965,925 issued November 15, 2005 (Distributed open architecture for 
media and telephony services which includes language independent interface; Background to Invention 
Section specifically notes: “As telephony applications have become more numerous and complex, 
interoperability problems have arisen.”)(Nortel Networks, Ltd., assignee); United States Patent No. 
6,968,555 issued November 22, 2005 (“Multi-layer software architecture for hardware control” which is 
described in abstract as “[a] software system having a multi-layer architecture for controlling a hardware 
system.”)(Agilent Technologies, Inc., assignee).  See also infra, note 275. 
41 See infra Parts II.F, III.C, III.D, and IV. 
42 See generally, Andrew Johnson-Laird, Software Reverse Engineering in the Real World, 19 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 843 (1994)(often-cited article describing what is technically involved in RE software).  
43 See discussion infra Part II.E. 
44 Although there is a growing movement under which all source-code information is published freely with 
the software (see e.g. discussion of Open Source and Free Software Movements, 
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-software-for-freedom.html) (last visited on January 16, 2006), a very 
large segment of the computer software and hardware industry continues to elect a model of object code 
distribution which enables preservation of trade secrets which inhere in the code.     
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compete with the original program without RE.  However, RE reduces the research and 
development costs of the competitor because it can simply free ride on the prior research 
and development of the original party.  Thus the competitor has a choice—the easier road 
or the harder road.  The easier road is to RE the original software to copy/clone the 
product.  The harder way is to learn the capabilities of the product from intelligent 
observation of the product in public use in the marketplace and study of published 
materials about the original product and thereafter undertake the necessary research and 
development costs and time to develop the competing program.    
 
However software, by its nature, presents a second RE scenario that cannot be 
adequately addressed through a cloning analysis.  Software programs often benefit from 
working or interoperating with other programs.45 Interoperation typically requires the 
ability to manage, store, or package data in a particular format defined by the original 
developer.  This presents a challenge when the original developer of the interface or 
format has chosen a closed model in which information about the interface or format is 
not published (the “closed technologist”).  For example, Apple has elected to keep the 
iTunes platform closed (as has AOL for its instant messaging) and does not publish the 
interface specifications needed for a competitor to develop a product to interoperate with 
iTunes.  It is for this reason that a consumer who wishes to use iTunes must acquire an 
iPod, rather than some device of a third party.46 
In such cases, a developer that wishes to interoperate with the original program’s 
format or interface must undertake some degree of RE to understand information 
concerning the methods of operation and data formats that enable interoperability with 
the targeted program.47 For purposes of this article, such information that is necessary to 
develop an independent interoperable program is defined as “interoperability 
information” (IO).  This definition is consistent with the approach to interoperability in 
federal, state and European law.48 It is this second RE scenario that is the subject of this 
article. 
 
C. The Detection Paradox 
Courts may be asked to enforce restrictions on RE of software in a spectrum of 
circumstances.  One significant ironic implication of broad interpretation of clauses 
restricting RE to include IO is the presence of a “detection paradox” under certain 
 
45 See generally Johnson-Laird, supra at note 42, at 852-56. 
46 To the extent that a party might have patents which read on the IO, the existence of the patent would 
require the disclosure of the IO.  The question for the competitor would then squarely be whether the 
patentee agreed to license any such IO patents. 
47 See generally Johnson-Laird, supra at note 42, at 852-56.  The original technologist may elect to preserve 
trade secrets concerning the internal operation of its software, yet publish the information concerning the 
methods of operation by which a program interoperates and formats data.  In such a case an interoperability 
developer can use that published IO to develop an interoperable product and it would not be necessary for 
the developer to reverse engineer the original software.    
48 Section 1201(f) of the DMCA (discussed infra, Part IV.B); Section 118 of the Uniform Computer 
Information Act (UCITA)(discussed infra, note 259), and Article 6 of the European Union Software 
Directive (discussed infra, note 289).   
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scenarios.  The detection paradox can be seen by comparing the actions and purposes of 
two distinct types of actors in the marketplace:  the “cloner” and the “IO developer”.  
Each reverse engineers software to discover secret information in a program.  However 
the scope of information sought to be discovered and the purpose of discovering that 
information is very different for the cloner than for the interoperability developer. 
The cloner reverse engineers a competitor’s software program to study secrets 
throughout the original technologist’s program.  As a result of this RE, the cloner then 
copies and uses various secrets in developing its product and free rides on the research 
and development time, cost and effort of the original developer embodied in those secrets.  
The cloner’s product competes with the targeted software but does not interoperate.   
The interoperability developer seeks to develop a program that will interoperate 
with the targeted program.  RE is limited to discovery, study and analysis of the targeted 
program’s IO.  The information is used to develop an independent49 program which 
incorporates only such information as is necessary to interoperate with another program50.
Both products are introduced into the market.  Which one is more likely to be 
detected by the targeted technologist as involving RE of secrets?  The interoperable 
product.  Its “interoperability” capability will be an immediate red flag to the original 
technologist in contrast to the cloner’s product which, though bearing similarities, has no 
red flag which raises the question of potential misappropriation of trade secrets.    
One can only hypothesize about the marketplace prevalence of RE for cloning 
purposes.51 The point is that it seems paradoxical to have a rule which is more likely to 
penalize the actor who is engaging in activity which is relatively more favored in the law 
 
49 “Independent” as used herein means that the program does not infringe any copyrightable expression of 
the targeted program.  However, “independent” does not mean that the program may not risk infringement 
of any patents which read on the “independent” program, including any relating to IO.   
50 Note here that the “other” program may be either the targeted program (see, e.g., Sega Enters. v. 
Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992)) or another program which interoperates with the reverse 
engineered program (see, e.g., Sony Computer Entm’t v. Connectix Corp., 203 F. 3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000). 
51 It is worth noting that with the rise in the Open Source Movement, there arguably has developed a culture 
within that community of an entitlement of free access to source code even where protected by a contract 
prohibiting RE.  See e.g., Brendan Chase, Gosling Questions Sun-Microsoft Pact, February 4, 2005 
http://builder.com.com/5100-6370_14-5563465.html (last visited January 16, 2005)(quoting James Gosling 
of Sun Microsystems: "In the past, what we'd have to do is reverse-engineering, and we had been getting 
into a pickle, because for open-source projects like Samba and OpenOffice, the only way to get the 
information was by reverse-engineering," he said. "Pretty much for all the countries in the world, reverse-
engineering was a perfectly fine thing to do.")  If that is the case and such RE occurs solely to learn secrets 
about proprietary programs unrelated to interoperability which is then used by the OSS community, there is 
a very real possibility of leakage of trade secrets that are unrelated to IO.  This is very significant in light of 
the Kewanee assumption of “weakness” of state trade secret law vis a vis federal patent protection.  See 
discussion infra Part III.C.   In passing it is interesting to note the parallel of free riding in the OSS 
movement and the free riders of copyrighted music and sound recordings by use of file sharing technology.
See supra, note 21. 
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(interoperability)52 than the party solely free riding on the trade secrets of a competitor.  
Thus it is unlikely that there will be an undetected leakage of IO trade secrets, whereas 
such trade secret leakage may occur without detection in the case of the cloner.  This 
Detection Paradox is a factor relevant to patent preemption discussed in Part III C. 
D. Law and Economics Perspectives 
 
Although there has been much debate, there is no firm conclusion from a law and 
economics perspective on whether RE of software for purposes of interoperability is 
beneficial.  In one of the leading articles on the law and economics of RE of software, 
Professors Samuelson and Scotchmer concluded: 
 
The economic case for allowing reverse engineering to achieve interoperability is 
not as open and shut as some legal commentators have suggested. We believe, 
however, that interoperability has, on balance, more beneficial than harmful 
economic consequences. Hence, a legal rule permitting reverse engineering of 
programs to achieve interoperability is economically sound.53 
Although they concluded that a legal rule in support of RE for interoperability purposes is 
“sound”, Samuelson and Scotchmer noted that there is debate about the benefits of a 
closed versus open model.54 
Given that the debate continues, it is worth noting the cumulative implications of 
five considerations concerning regulation of IO not reviewed collectively to date:  (1) the 
detection difficulties in the less justifiable case of RE to clone software features as 
contrasted with the relative ease of identifying potential RE where interoperability is 
involved; (2) the transformation of trade secret rights in IO from weak in personam rights 
to property-like rights by wholesale enforceability of shrink-wrap and web-wrap licenses 
without considering patent and trade secret law; (3) the detailed teachings of the Supreme 
Court on patent preemption in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.55 and Bonito Boats, Inc. 
v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.56; (4) the competition in regulation of IO between federal 
patent law and state protection by enforcement of non-negotiated mass market license 
terms restricting RE; and (5) a comparative law analysis showing that an increasing 
number of key jurisdictions have adopted a legal rule permitting such RE notwithstanding 
any contrary contract prohibition.   
 
In addition to the law and economics rationale identified by Samuelson and 
Scotchmer, these five considerations provide compelling support for a legal rule 
permitting RE for interoperability purposes notwithstanding a mass market contract 
restriction to the contrary to avoid conflicts with fundamental limits on state trade secret 
 
52 See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
53 Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 9, at 1608. 
54 Id.
55 416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
56 489 U.S. 141 (1989). 
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law and the patent laws enacted under the Intellectual Property Clause of the 
Constitution.57 
E. State Trade Secret Law58 
Trade secrets have been protected by an amalgam of theories including tort, 
equity, contract and “property”59. Although the scope of information potentially 
protected is quite broad and arguably solely limited by a test of some commercial value, 
there are several key limits on the scope of protection.  These limits are where 
information is (1) readily ascertainable from public sources; (2) available by independent 
discovery; or (3) subject to discovery by proper means.   
 
The most critical “proper means” is a competitor’s freedom to RE a product that it 
lawfully acquires in the marketplace.60 This freedom to RE reflects the underlying policy 
of encouraging competition.  The Supreme Court has highlighted this freedom as a key 
limit to the scope of trade secret protection under state law. 61 
Shortly after the Supreme Court’s 1974 decision in Kewanee, the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act (USTA) was adopted as a model for adoption by the states, and has since 
been adopted by 45 states and the District of Columbia.62 The Prefatory Note to the 
USTA makes clear that the ability to RE a product available in the marketplace is a 
 
57 In fact, the failure to adopt such an approach is unlikely to lead to the desired outcome of preventing such 
RE.  Rather, it will simply incent developers to undertake such activities in jurisdictions which have 
adopted such a rule—whether that is in particular states in the U.S. or-- as is more likely-- in foreign 
jurisdictions which permit such activity.  See, e.g., Colloquium, Intellectual Property Arbitrage: How 
Foreign Rules Can Affect Domestic Protections, 71 U CHI. L. REV. 223, (2004) [hereinafter Intellectual 
Property Arbitrage].  Further, it arguably disadvantages small enterprises that may not have the ability to 
move such activities to a favorable jurisdiction. 
58 The general discussion is based upon both the Restatement of Torts, Restatement (Second) of Torts 
(1965), and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (1985).   
59 In Cadence Design Systems, Inc. v. Avant! Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 215 (2002), the California Supreme Court, 
quoting Justice Holmes, rejected the  “property” theory of trade secrets, and held that the California Trade 
Secrets Act is based upon the relationship theory: 
Underlying this theory is the concept that a trade secret is in the nature of property, which 
is damaged or destroyed by the adverse use . . . California does not treat trade secrets as if 
they were property. It is the relationship between the parties at the time the secret is 
disclosed that is protected.  The protected relationship, contractual or confidential, is one 
to which, as Mr. Justice Holmes observed, 'some rudimentary requirements of good faith' 
are attached. ‘Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not the defendant knows 
the facts, whatever they are, through a special confidence that he accepted. The property 
may be denied, but the confidence cannot be. Therefore the starting point for the present 
matter is not property . . ., but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the 
plaintiffs . . .’ (E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland (1917) 244 U.S. 100, 
102, 37 S.Ct. 575, 576, 61 L.Ed.2d 1016.) 
219-20. 
60 Kewanee, 416 U.S.; Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. 
61 See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S.; discussion infra Part III; Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act 
(UCITA) §118 cmt. 3 (2002), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/2002final.htm (last 
visited Jan. 9, 2006) (citing Bonito Boats as authority).  See also discussion infra Part V.A. 
62 See ULA database on Westlaw (last visited Dec. 16, 2005). 
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fundamental touchstone which limits and distinguishes trade secret from patent 
protection: 
The Uniform Act codifies the basic principles of common law trade secret 
protection, preserving its essential distinctions from patent law. Under 
both the Act and common law principles, for example, more than one 
person can be entitled to trade secret protection with respect to the same 
information, and analysis involving the "reverse engineering" of a 
lawfully obtained product in order to discover a trade secret is 
permissible.63 
Likewise, the Comment to Section 1 of the UTSA, which illustrates actionable 
trade secret misappropriation, makes clear that RE of a product that is lawfully acquired 
in the marketplace is a proper means of discovering a secret: 
 
Proper means include: 
 
2.  Discovery by "reverse engineering", that is, by starting with the known product 
and working backward to find the method by which it was developed. The 
acquisition of the known product must, of course, also be by a fair and honest 
means, such as purchase of the item on the open market for reverse engineering to 
be lawful. . . . 
 
Trade secret law also requires the secret to be “the subject of efforts that are 
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”64 One reasonable step to 
protect a trade secret is contract.  In this context, contract law is merely the instrument 
through which the underlying policy of protecting a trade secret is affected.65 As a 
general rule, courts will enforce contract terms.  However, contracts are unenforceable 
where they are unconscionable, preempted by federal law, or contrary to public policy. 66 
Against this backdrop, we now consider mass market license restrictions on RE. 
 
F. The Proper Role of Contract in Support of Trade Secrets 
Although there has been debate on whether mass market license restrictions on 
RE clauses should be preempted by virtue of federal copyright policy67, and some general 
 
63 Uniform Trade Secrets Act (1985). 
64 Id. §1(4)(ii). 
65 See David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract, and Public Policy: Federal Preemption of Software 
License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 543, 547 n.13 (1992); see also 
DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th 864, 901 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2003) (Moreno, J., concurring) 
(“[t]o be sure, contract plays an important role in trade secret law by protecting the trade secret holder 
against ‘unauthorized use or disclosure through a contract with the recipient of a disclosure’ or others who 
have had a special access to trade secret information, via confidentiality agreements and the like.  (Rest. 3d 
Unfair Competition, § 41, com. D, p. 471, italics added.)”) 
66 See Part V.A infra.
67 See e.g., Maureen O’Rourke, Drawing The Boundary Between Copyright and Contract:  Copyright 
Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479 (1995); Lemley, supra note 17 at 1255-59; 
Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers:  The Relation Between Contract and Intellectual Property Law,
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discussion about patent policy,68 minimal attention has focused on the dramatic 
implications for state trade secret law.  
The traditional notion of the appropriate instrumental role of contract restrictions 
to preserve secrets made sense when individually negotiated contracts were involved or 
courts could reasonably imply contractual obligations based upon trust, confidence, or 
other special relationship.  As such, trade secrets are not “property” but rather 
enforceable as in personam rights.  As discussed above, a key doctrinal limit is the 
general distribution and availability in the marketplace of a product which then exposes 
the trade secret to potential discovery, analysis, and use by RE (i.e., “lawful 
appropriation” or “fair means”).   
But as some courts have come to accept mass market licenses in their entirety as 
enforceable,69 there has not been any in-depth consideration by the courts of the 
implications on the scope of trade secrets and the inherent limitation on trade secret 
protection by virtue of the fundamental freedom to RE any product publicly available in 
the marketplace.70 At its core, contract law enforcement of a non-negotiated mass market 
license barring RE subverts the fundamental principle of trade secret law that a 
competitor is free to RE a product which is publicly available in the marketplace.  The 
net result is the transformation of an in personam right to protect trade secret information 
into a property right in that information.   
Thus what had until recently been a state law right in trade secrets circumscribed 
by the doctrine of permissible RE of mass distributed products has now potentially 
expanded effectively by contract law (including choice of law terms) into a nation-wide 
property right without any of the limitations built into other IP regimes, such as novelty, 
nonobviousness, experimental use, first sale, fair use, or misuse.   
 
13 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 827, 861-67, at 67 (1998)(focusing on copyright preemption and in fact 
expressly rejecting applicability of patent preemption to software licenses: “Of course, however, Bonito by 
its very terms does not state a principle that pertains to state laws that enable parties to enforce relationships 
they have created.  Trade secret law, contract law, and similar relationship contexts fall well outside the 
parameters of the decision in Bonito.”).  For the reasons outlined in this article, see in particular discussion 
at Part III, I beg to differ with Professor Nimmer’s appraisal of the lack of relevance of Bonito to the 
question of the enforceability of a mass market license term.  See also cases discussed infra Part III.D;  See 
also Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 9 (no mention of patent preemption). 
68 See McManis, supra note 13, at 94; Rice, supra note 65, at 577-95; Mark I. Koffshy, Note, Patent 
Preemption of Computer Software Contracts Restricting Reverse Engineering: The Last Stand?, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 1160, 1169-87 (1995)(see discussion of commentators at note 17).   Almost all discussion has 
focused on federal preemption of shrink-wrap licenses based solely upon copyright policy.  See e.g., 
O’Rourke, supra note 67.  The discussion here is on fundamental state law policy of protecting trade 
secrets.  The drafters of UCITA recognized this tension.  See supra note 61. 
69 See Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 302 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 
422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
70 But see DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th 864 (2003) (Moreno, J., concurring); discussion 
infra  Parts IV.C, V.B.  See also Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 
SOUTHERN CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1268 (1995)(“Reverse engineering of a trade secret is explicitly allowed 
by the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Thus, the Act conflicts with contract law where the contract provides 
that a licensee may not reverse engineer the licensed product.”) 
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Several commentators have noted this dramatic transformation of in personam 
contract-supported trade secret law to “rights against the world”71 which is further 
cemented in the context of web-based delivery of software:  
If [licensors] then combine this power [of web wrap license assent] with 
the power inherent in [shrink-wrap license enforceability] to impose non-
negotiable, standard terms and conditions on those who seek access … the 
net effect is privately to impose “rights ‘against the world-at-large.’”  In 
short, when the power of the two-party deal in the digital universe is 
combined with the power to impose non-negotiable terms, it produces 
contracts (not “agreements”) that are roughly equivalent to private 
legislation that is valid against the world. 72 
The drafters of UCITA also appreciated the undeniable and fundamental tension between 
freedom of contract and competing federal policies and trade secret policies in the case of 
mass market licensing of software. 73 
With this background on trade secret law and the potential tension created by 
mass market license enforceability on the scope of trade secret protection, review of 
federal IP law and policies on IO is in order. 
 
III. Patent Preemption  
 
A. The Basis for Patent Preemption:  Prevention of IP Regulatory 
Competition in Patent-Like Monopolies Between the U.S. and the 
States 
The Supreme Court has held that the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution74 does not occupy the field and thereby forbid the States75 to act at all to 
regulate IP.76 In contrast, Professor Arthur Miller has recently commented that the issue 
 
71 See discussion infra accompanying note 142.  
72 J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling 
Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875, 911 (1999) (quoting 
U.C.C. §2B-105, reporter’s notes, no.1 (proposed Official Draft Aug. 1998)). 
73 See the Official Comment to section 105 of UCITA, discussed infra at Part IV. 
74 Art. I, §8, cl. 8.  
75 There are limits in the IP Clause on Congress’ grant of power to create monopolies under patent law.  See 
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989)(“The Patent Clause itself reflects 
a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle 
competition without any concomitant advance in the Progress of Science and Useful Arts [which] contains 
both a grant of power and certain limitations upon the exercise of that power.”)(giving as examples that 
Congress cannot “create patent monopolies of unlimited duration, . . . [or] whose effects are to remove 
existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.” ). 
76 See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (state regulation of unauthorized recordings of 
performances were Constitutional “writings” not preempted by copyright law); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron 
Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (no patent preemption of state regulation of trade secrets including use of 
negotiated contract to enforce a secret (whether patentable or not)). 
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of what limits the IP Clause places on state regulation of IP has varied over time and 
noted that a dormant IP Clause view was espoused by Learned Hand: 
Justice Hand believed that the Constitution embodied a federal policy of 
competition and public access to literary and artistic creativity.  The presumption 
was that everything that could be considered a “writing” or “discovery” lies in the 
public domain unless Congress chooses to protect it (which Congress can do only 
for limited times and only for “advancing science and the useful arts”). Congress 
must be the sole arbiter of what works are entitled to protection, according to the 
Hand analysis, and thus, even when Congress has failed to act, states must refrain 
from doing so.  This “dormant” copyright and patent power prohibits states from 
regulating any subject matter or creating any rights that fall within the scope of 
the constitutional clause.77 
Although the Supreme Court in Kewanee78 and Bonito Boats79 rejected the idea of 
a dormant Patent Clause which would preempt state regulation absent Congressional 
action or intent, Professor Miller has suggested that the discussion in Bonito Boats is 
dicta: 
A future Court, more sympathetic to the claims of federal hegemony and wary of 
the vagaries and parochialisms of different state laws in a world  of national 
media, distribution, and marketing, could effect yet another jurisprudential shift, 
especially if a state-created right presented a serious obstacle to achieving a 
congressional objective.80 
Interestingly, the concerns raised by Professor Miller if state regulation is “a 
serious obstacle to achieving a congressional objective” are precisely met by reference to 
statutory conflicts preemption as articulated by Chief Justice Burger in Kewanee81 and do 
not require reliance on a dormant IP clause jurisprudence.82 In fact, Professor Miller’s 
 
77 Arthur R. Miller, Common Law Protection for Products of the Mind:  An “Idea” Whose Time Has Come,
119 HARV. L. REV. 703, 747, n. 171 (2006) (citing Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 
F.2d 657, 664-68 (2d Cir. 1955)(Hand, J., dissenting). 
78 416 U.S. at 479 (Burger, C.J.)(italics added): 
Just as the States may exercise regulatory power over writings so may the States regulate with 
respect to discoveries.  States may hold diverse viewpoints in protecting intellectual property to 
invention as they do in protecting the intellectual property relating to the subject matter of 
copyright.  The only limitation on the States is that in regulating the area of patents and 
copyrights they do not conflict with the operation of the laws in this area passed by Congress. . . . 
79 489 U.S. at 165 (“Our decisions since Sears and Compco have made it clear that the  Patent and 
Copyright Clauses do not, by their own force or by negative implication, deprive the States of the power to 
adopt rules for the promotion of intellectual creation within their own jurisdictions.”)  
80 Miller, supra note 77, at 749. 
81 416 U.S. at 479.  
82 There might be some scenario that might lead to reference to a dormant IP clause argument, but arguably 
the statutory conflicts analysis which is discussed in this Article will suffice in most instances since in the 
case of patent preemption, the Supreme Court has held that the patent laws themselves reflect 
Congressional policies on the balance between free competition and the need to create statutory rights to 
incent “discoveries” in the useful arts.  See discussion infra, text accompanying note 90.  See also 
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S.546, 558 (1973)(noting that “[t]he standards established for granting 
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language tracks that used by the Supreme Court in its decisions dealing with patent law 
conflicts preemption.  Thus, the Court has held that state law (whether statute or 
contract)83 is preempted where the effect of enforcement of the state regulation conflicts 
84 or clashes85 with the operation of the federal patent and copyright laws.86 The 
underlying premise in Supreme Court patent preemption decisions is an express rejection 
of regulatory competition between federal patent law and some equivalent form of state 
regulation of IP for functional matter, whether patentable or not: 
States may not offer patent-like protection to intellectual creations which 
would otherwise remain unprotected as a matter of federal law.  Both the 
novelty and the nonobviousness requirements of federal patent law are 
grounded in the notion that concepts within the public grasp, or those so 
obvious that they readily could be, are the tools of creation available to all.  
They provide the baseline of free competition upon which the patent 
system’s incentive to creative effort depends. . . . Moreover, through the 
creation of patent-like rights, the States could essentially redirect inventive 
efforts away from the careful criteria of patentability developed by 
Congress over the last 200 years.87 
The question is whether a state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress”88 in striking a balance to 
create incentives to invention and disclosure by granting a limited monopoly right for 
methods of operation, processes and other “useful arts.”89 The Court has concluded that 
 
federal patent protection to machines thus indicated not only which articles in this particular category 
Congress wished to protect, but which configurations it wished to remain free.”)  From a dormant IP Clause 
perspective, Burger C.J. in Goldstein did suggest that where state regulation “will prejudice the interests of 
other States [rather than effect protection] within its boundaries” there might be a case of IP Clause 
preemption. Id. at 558.  See also Kozinki J.’s  reference to this proposition in his dissent in White v. 
Samsung Electronics, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993): “Under the dormant Copyright Clause, state 
intellectual property laws can stand only so long as they don’t ‘prejudice the interests of other states.’  A 
state law criminalizing record piracy, for instance, is permissible because citizens of other states would 
remain free to copy within their borders those works which may be protected elsewhere.’  But the right of 
publicity isn’t geographically limited.” (quoting without citation to  Burger, C.J. in Goldstein, id.)  
Interestingly, the case of a mass market license, which typically includes an enforceable choice of law 
clause (and thus has nation-wide effect), would be subject to a dormant IP clause preemption, but that issue 
need not be addressed because it so squarely falls under the patent conflicts preemption analysis outlined 
infra, Part III.C.  Another possible application of dormant IP Clause preemption would be mass market 
terms limiting fair use/free speech on a nation-wide basis.  See e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista 
Home Entertainment Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3rd Cir. 2003) (copyright misuse might apply to free speech 
restriction, but not in particular case);  Ty, Inc. v. Publications Intern., Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 520 (7th Cir. 
2002)(Posner J. noting concerns with copyright license term which restricted criticism by licensee of 
licensor). 
83 See id. (Florida statute);  Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969) (enforcement of license preempted). 
84 See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 479. 
85 See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 152. 
86See generally Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000) (general review of the 
different theories of preemption of state law). 
87 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156-57. 
88 Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 479 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
89 See id. at 480; Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 152. 
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the “novelty and nonobviousness requirements [of patent law] express a congressional 
determination that the purposes behind the Patent Clause are best served by free 
competition and exploitation of either that which is already available to the public or that 
which may be readily discerned from publicly available material.”90 
In a nutshell, although there is no preemption of the field of regulating IP, the 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution91 requires preemption of any state law which either 
(1) provides a party (whether investor or inventor) a realistic and potentially preferable 
option to the limited term monopoly grant offered by patent law, or (2) provides patent-
like protection for functional matter which does not meet the novelty and nonobviousness 
requirements of patent law and thereby stifles competition in such matter without any 
concomitant advance in the Progress of Science and Useful Arts.  This is because “state 
regulation of intellectual property must yield to the extent it clashes with the balance 
struck by Congress in our patent laws” . . . [to resolve the constant] tension between the 
desire to freely exploit the full potential of our inventive resources and the need to create 
an incentive to deploy those resources.” 92 
Indeed, trade secret law itself has been considered as potentially preempted by 
patent law.  In Kewanee, the Supreme Court held that Ohio trade secret law as sought to 
be enforced by the plaintiff was not preempted by federal patent law.93 It was “central” 
to the Court’s determination of no preemption that Ohio state trade secret law provided 
“weaker” protection than patent law.94 Accordingly, state regulation of trade secrets did 
not jeopardize the underlying purposes of patent law and lead to regulatory competition 
between state regulation and patent law.  The Kewanee decision was not unanimous.  
Justices Douglas and Brennan dissented because the product in Kewanee was patentable, 
and they determined that “Congress in the patent laws decided that where no patent 
existed, free competition should prevail.”95 
90 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 150. 
91 Art. VI, cl. 2. 
92 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 152. 
93 Kewanee, 416 U.S. 
94 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 155.  (The Court in Bonito Boats specifically made this assessment of its prior 
decision in Kewanee). 
95 Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 495.  Interestingly, Justice Douglas concluded that it was only the permanent 
injunction issued by the district court that was preempted by patent law: 
A suit to redress theft of a trade secret is grounded in tort damages for breach of a contract – a 
historic remedy.  Damages for breach of a confidential relation are not pre-empted by this patent 
law, but an injunction against use is pre-empted because the patent law states the only monopoly 
over trade secrets that is enforceable by specific performance; and that monopoly exacts as a price 
full disclosure.  A trade secret can be protected only by being kept secret.  Damages for breach of 
a contract are one thing; an injunction barring disclosure does service for the protection accorded 
valid patents and is therefore pre-empted. 
Id. at 498-99.  Adoption of this approach would effect a compulsory license of the trade secret, and lead to 
the same outcome some are now positing for patent law reform where injunctive relief might not be 
available for patent trolls.  See Patent Reform Bill 2005.  See also EBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC., 401 
F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 74 U.S.L.W. 3321 (U.S. Nov. 28, 2005)(No. 05-130)(is patentee 
entitled to injunctive relief as matter of right or based upon equitable principles). 
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In contrast, where state protection would give rise to regulatory competition in IP 
laws or protect utilitarian matter which has does not qualify for patent protection, it has 
been preempted.96 For that reason, the Florida boat hull protection statute was preempted 
in Bonito Boats by a unanimous Court: 
One of the fundamental purposes behind the Patent and Copyright Clauses 
of the Constitution was to promote national uniformity in the realm of 
intellectual property. . . .  Since the Patent Act of 1800, Congress has 
lodged exclusive jurisdiction of actions “arising under” the patent laws in 
the federal courts, thus allowing for the development of a uniform body of 
law in resolving the constant tension been private right and public 
access.  . . .  Recently, Congress conferred exclusive jurisdiction of all 
patent appeals on the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in order to 
“provide nationwide uniformity in patent law.” .  . . This purpose is 
frustrated by the Florida scheme, which renders the status of the design 
and utilitarian “ideas” embodied in the boat hulls it protects uncertain.  
Given the inherently ephemeral nature of property in ideas, and the great 
power such property has to cause harm to the competitive policies which 
underlay the federal patent laws, the demarcation of broad zones of public 
and private right is “the type of regulation that demands a uniform national 
rule.” . . . Absent such a federal rule, each State could afford patent-like 
protection to particularly favored home industries, effectively insulating 
them from competition outside the State. 97 
In preempting the Florida statute, the Court explicitly viewed the statute as 
leading to IP regulatory competition: 
Given the substantial protection offered by the Florida scheme, we cannot 
dismiss as hypothetical the possibility that it will become a significant 
competitor to federal patent laws, offering investors similar protection 
without the quid pro quo of substantial creative effort required by the 
federal statute.  The prospect of all 50 States establishing similar 
protections for preferred industries without the rigorous requirements of 
patentability prescribed by Congress could pose a substantial threat to the 
patent system’s ability to accomplish its mission of promoting progress in 
the useful arts.98 
In the case of IO, the risk of regulation competition is likewise not some 
hypothetical possibility.  There is very real competition among the state and the federal 
regulatory schemes. 99 For example, the Federal and Eighth Circuits100 have enforced 
 
96 See, e.g., Bonito Boats, 489 U.S.; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco 
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). 
97 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 162-63. 
98 Id. at 161. 
99 It has the potential for a predictable and deleterious effect on the United States economy both directly in 
preventing interoperable products entrance into the marketplace and long term because it will incent IO 
developers to undertake RE in favorable foreign jurisdictions.  See discussion infra Part VI.   
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mass market license terms preventing RE through interpretation of California and 
Massachusetts state contract law.  In addition, the Seventh Circuit ruling in ProCD v 
Zeidenberg101 may be interpreted as opening the door to general enforceability of mass 
market software license terms.  In contrast, a reasoned application of either the “public 
policy” exception to contract enforcement or the UCITA “fundamental public policy” 
exception102 to contract enforcement adopted by Maryland and Virginia should lead a 
court applying state law to invalidate a mass market restriction to the extent it prevented 
discovery and use of IO.103 However, four state legislatures have adopted “bombshell” 
legislation whereby the courts of that state will not apply UCITA rules in enforcing an 
agreement against a resident of the state, even where a contract specifies that a UCITA 
jurisdiction’s law applies to a contract.104 
The net effect of this regulatory competition is that closed model technologists 
may forego patent protection of IO or have information not meeting the requirements for 
patentability and rely on state laws such as California and Massachusetts which have 
been interpreted to favor enforcement of mass market contract terms prohibiting RE, 
including choice and conflict of law rules.105 
If ever there was an area where courts need to consider the risk of impermissible 
regulatory competition of IP, the case of state protection of IO by enforcement of mass 
market licenses may be it.  With this background, a careful examination of the Supreme 
Court patent preemption decisions is appropriate. 
B. Patent Preemption Test of Kewanee and Bonito Boats 
Despite early doubt,106 it is now clear that software related inventions are 
patentable.  A search of the PTO database revealed a surprising number of recently issued 
patents relating to compatibility features of computer hardware and software.107 Thus 
interfaces, protocols and other formats may potentially be patented.  For this reason, the 
 
100 See discussion infra Part III.D. 
101 86 F.3d 1447 (1996). 
102 Maryland and Virginia have both adopted UCITA with section 105 but without section 118.  MD. 
CODE §22-105 (2005); VA. CODE §59.1-501.5 (2005). 
103 Since section 105(b) has been adopted in Maryland and Virginia, arguably correct application of that 
section is that public policy invalidates a clause prohibiting RE of IO information solely for purposes of 
developing an interoperable product under Maryland and Virginia.  See discussion infra Part V.A. 
104 See, e.g., IOWA CODE §554D.104 (2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. §66-329 (2005); 9 VT. STAT. §2463a (2005); 
W.VA. CODE §55-8-15 (2005); see generally ROBERT W. GOMULKIEWICZ, ET. AL., LICENSING TREATISE 
(forthcoming (2006)) (manuscript at Ch. 1 n.80, on file with author).  My thanks to Professor Bob 
Gomulkiewicz for raising this point. 
105 Although this strategy may work in interstate commerce, there are serious doubts about it in the 
international context.  A rationale IO technologist will realize that it has a better prospect of invalidating a 
contract term when the conflict of law analysis implicates international, as contrasted with merely interstate, 
comity issues.  Accordingly the IO technologist will outsource the activity to a foreign jurisdiction whose 
laws, ironically, are consistent with federal policies as outlined in this article.  The net result is that 
technologists seeking to develop interoperable software will be incented to conduct such activities in 
foreign jurisdictions which increasingly have contract override rules in the case of RE for IO. 
106 See Smith and Mann, supra note 14.  
107 See supra note 40. 
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potential patent preemption of a mass market contract term barring RE necessary to learn 
secret IO must be addressed.   
 
Although there has been some general discussion,108 no one has scrutinized the 
reasoning which underpins the Supreme Court decisions on the topic to identify the 
prospect for an “enlightened”109 patent preemption to mass market license restrictions on 
RE undertaken solely for purposes of developing an interoperable program.  In sum, the 
Supreme Court has upheld trade secret protection because it “provides much weaker 
protection” than patents110 yet preempted state law which effectively grants a producer of 
a non-patented article “rights against the world.”111 In considering the issue, the freedom 
to RE a publicly available product in the marketplace has been central to the Court’s 
attention.   
 
Kewanee112 remains the seminal case on the interplay between federal patent and 
state trade secret laws.  In Kewanee, plaintiff sued its former employees for 
misappropriation of its trade secrets which had been protected by employment contract 
terms imposing confidentiality on the employees.  In reversing the Sixth Circuit’s ruling 
that patent law preempted the trade secret claim, the Supreme Court undertook a detailed 
analysis of the scope of Ohio trade secret law in comparison to federal patent law.  
 
The Court’s analysis began with a summary of the Constitutional purpose behind 
the patent and copyright clause and patent law: 
 
The stated objective of the Constitution in granting the power to Congress 
to legislate in the area of intellectual property is to “promote the Progress 
of Science and the useful Arts.”  The patent laws promote this progress by 
 
108 See supra note 13 (listing early commentators who argued that all reverse engineering terms were 
preempted by patent, but did not suggest application of the 5 factor test outlined in this Article) and 
discussion infra text accompanying notes 153-56 (same); See also Daniel R. Cahoy, Oasis or Mirage?: 
Efficient Breach as a Relief to the Burden of Contractual Recapture of Patent and Copyright Limitations,
17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 135, 158-59 (2003) (raising general issue of patent preemption of shrink-wrap 
licenses, but quickly concluding in light of recent cases that it “has not, to date, emerged as a substantial 
hurdle”);  John E. Mauk, Note, The Slippery Slope of Secrecy: Why Patent Law Preempts Reverse-
Engineering Clauses in Shrink-Wrap Licenses, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 819 (2001) (suggesting 
preemption of all RE clauses without any detailed analysis of the different scope and purposes of RE and 
the key reasoning of the Supreme Court in Kewanee and Bonito Boats discussed in this Article); JONATHAN 
BAND & MASANOBU KATOH, INTERFACES ON TRIAL: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTEROPERABILITY IN 
THE GLOBAL SOFTWARE INDUSTRY, 223-24 (1995) (even more limited analysis than Mauk).  Cf., O’Rourke, 
supra note 67, at 539 (focusing (incorrectly from this author’s perspective) on copyright preemption and 
only mentioning patent preemption, “as a guide in discussing constitutional copyright preemption.”)  See 
also Nimmer, supra note 67 (expressly dismissing any applicability of the principle in Bonito Boats to the 
question of enforceability of a software license term). 
109 Reichman and Franklin conjectured that it was possible, but rejected it as a practical matter.  See 
discussion infra text accompanying note 162. 
110 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 489-90 (1974). 
111 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. 
112 416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
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offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to 
inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research, and 
development.  The productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive 
effect on society through the introduction of new products and processes 
of manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased 
employment and better lives for our citizens.  In return for the right of 
exclusion-this “reward for inventions,”-the patent laws impose upon the 
inventor a requirement of disclosure.113 
The Court then proceeded to articulate the underlying policy of state trade secret 
protection114:
The maintenance of standards of commercial ethics and the encouragement of 
invention are the broadly stated policies behind trade secret law.  “The necessity 
of good faith and honest, fair dealing, is the very life and spirit of the commercial 
world.”  
 
In deciding that Ohio trade secret law was not preempted, the Court applied the 
test of whether the “scheme of protection developed by Ohio respecting trade secrets 
‘clashes with objectives of the federal patent laws.’”115 The Court reviewed Ohio trade 
secret law which adopted the “widely relied-upon” trade secret definition from the 
Restatement of Torts.116 That definition recognized that RE of a publicly available 
product is a lawful way to discover secret information: 
 
A trade secret law . . . does not offer protection against discovery by fair 
and honest means, such as by independent invention, accidental disclosure, 
or by so-called reverse engineering, that is by starting with the known 
product and working backward to divine the process which aided in its 
development or manufacture.117 
The Kewanee Court reasoned that Ohio trade secret law was not preempted as a 
general matter because it provided “far weaker protection in many respects than patent 
law.”    
 
Trade secret law provides far weaker protection in many respects than the 
patent law. While trade secret law does not forbid the discovery of the 
trade secret by fair and honest means, e.g., independent creation or reverse 
engineering, patent law operates ‘against the world,’ forbidding any use of 
the invention for whatever purpose for a significant length of time. The 
holder of a trade secret also takes a substantial risk that the secret will be 
 
113 Id. at 480. 
114 Id. at 481-82 (quoting National Tube Co. v. Eastern Tube Co., 3 Ohio C.C. R. (n.s.) 459, 462 (1902), 
aff'd, 69 Ohio St. 560, 70 N.E. 1127 (1903).   
115 Id. at 480 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964). 
116 Id. at 474. 
117 Id. at 476.  
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passed on to his competitors, by theft or by breach of a confidential 
relationship, in a manner not easily susceptible of discovery or proof. 
Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d, at 224. Where patent law acts as 
a barrier, trade secret law functions relatively as a sieve.118 
The Supreme Court in Bonito Boats stressed that the Kewanee Court 
determination that Ohio state trade secret law was weaker than patent law “was central to 
the Court’s conclusion that trade secret protection did not conflict with either the 
encouragement or disclosure policies of the federal patent law.”119 
In addition, the Bonito Boats Court discussed at length the fundamental 
importance of RE of publicly available products in considering whether patent law 
preempts state law.  In reaffirming Kewanee, the Court noted, “The public at large 
remained free to discover and exploit the trade secret through reverse engineering of 
products in the public domain. . . .”120 
In contrast, the unavailability of RE under the Florida boat hull protection statute 
was its fatal flaw (which was not saved by the alternative possibility of independent 
creation): 
 
That the Florida statute does not remove all means of reproduction and 
sale does not eliminate conflict with the federal scheme.  In essence, the 
Florida law prohibits the entire public from engaging in a form of reverse 
engineering of a product in the public domain.  This is clearly one of the 
rights vested in the federal patent holder, but has never been a part of state 
protection under the law of unfair competition or trade secrets.  See 
Kewanee, (“A trade secret law, however, does not offer protection against 
discovery by . . . so-called reverse engineering, that is by starting with the 
known product and working backward to divine the process which aided 
in its development or manufacture”); see also Chicago Lock Co. v. 
Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400, 405 (9th Cir. 1982) (“A lock purchaser’s own 
reverse-engineering of his own lock, and subsequent publication of the 
serial number-key code correlation, is an example of the independent 
invention and reverse engineering expressly allowed by trade secret 
doctrine”).  The duplication of boat hulls and their component parts may 
be an essential part of innovation in the field of hydrodynamic design.  
Variations as to size and combination of various elements may lead to 
significant advances in the field.  Reverse engineering of chemical and 
mechanical articles in the public domain often leads to significant 
advances in technology.  If Florida may prohibit this particular method of 
study and recomposition of an unpatented article, we fail to see the 
principle that would prohibit a State from banning the use of 
 
118 Id. at 489-90 (footnote omitted); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 
155 (1989) (quoting Kewanee with approval). 
119 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 490. 
120 Id. 
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chromatography in the reconstitution of unpatented chemical compounds, 
or the use of robotics in the duplication of machinery in the public domain.  
Moreover, as we noted in Kewanee, the competitive reality of reverse 
engineering may act as a spur to the inventor, creating an incentive to 
develop inventions that meet the rigorous requirements of patentability.121 
The Bonito Boat reference to Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg122 is particularly 
significant because the Ninth Circuit reasoned that use of state law to imply an obligation 
against the public not to RE a publicly available product would be subject to patent 
preemption.123 
In Chicago Lock, the plaintiff Chicago Lock did not publish information about the 
key codes for its Ace locks—the information necessary to make keys that would interface 
with the locks.  By virtue of maintaining the secrecy of the key codes, plaintiff sought to 
preclude parties from making the keys necessary to operate the locks and thereby 
maintain control of the market for replacement keys.  The defendant locksmiths solicited 
key codes for plaintiff’s locks from other locksmiths who had disassembled the plaintiff’s 
locks124 and compiled those key codes in a two-volume publication.   
 
The plaintiff sued defendants claiming that their misappropriation of trade secrets 
constituted an unfair business practice.  The district court ruled in plaintiff’s favor.  On 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that California trade secret law permitted RE of the 
purchased locks to discover the key codes.  In addition, the Court held that if California 
law were interpreted to impose on the purchasers of the locks an implied obligation not to 
RE, it would be contrary to California trade secrets law and preempted by patent law: 
 
Imposing an obligation of nondisclosure on lock owners here would 
frustrate the intent of California courts to disallow protection to trade 
secrets discovered through “fair and honest means.” .  .  .   Further, such 
an implied obligation upon the lock owners in this case would, in effect, 
convert the Company’s trade secret into a state-conferred monopoly akin 
to the absolute protection that a federal patent affords.  Such an extension 
of California trade secrets law would certainly be preempted by the federal 
scheme of patent regulation.125 
Chicago Lock makes clear that patent preemption must be considered where state law is 
construed to override the general freedom to RE a product available in the marketplace.  
Chicago Lock is also interesting because arguably there were public policy reasons based 
on physical security to enforce a RE prohibition, yet the court did not consider this. 126 
121 Id. at 160. 
122 676 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1982). 
123 See id.
124 The defendant locksmiths also disassembled some of the plaintiff’s locks themselves, but it was the 
activity of the third party locksmiths which was the primary focus of the court’s analysis.   
125 Chicago Lock, 676 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1982). 
126 That is, at another level, maintaining secrecy of the key codes furthered a public interest—preserving the 
security of the premises of Ace lock owners, yet the court does not even address this policy interest.  The 
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Although one might try to distinguish Chicago Lock because it did not involve 
use of contract law to protect a trade secret, the mere fact that a contract is involved does 
not save it from the risk of patent preemption.  In Lear, Inc. v. Adkins127, the Supreme 
Court refused to apply licensee estoppel and thereby enforce a negotiated license term 
preventing the licensee from challenging the validity of a patent on an idea which was the 
subject of the license.128 The Court recognized that, “[a]t the core of this case, then, is 
the difficult question whether federal patent policy bars a State from enforcing a contract 
regulating access to an unpatented secret idea.”129 Yet the Court held that enforcement of 
a negotiated license may, under certain instances, be preempted by patent law.  The 
fundamental teaching of Lear is that contract law cannot be enforced where it may lead to 
monopoly protection of functional information which does not meet the patent law 
requirements of novelty and nonobviousness which are necessary to merit a patent. 
 
What is significant in the combined teachings of these cases is the Supreme 
Court’s reliance on three factors in concluding that state trade secret law protection was 
not preempted by patent law because it was “weaker protection”: (1) RE is a “fair and 
honest means” of discovery of a trade secret; (2) trade secrets are enforceable by breach 
of a relationship, and do not operate “against the world”;130 and (3) trade secret 
misappropriation is “not easily susceptible of discovery or proof.”   
 
In addition, Kewanee and Bonito Boats teach that two additional factors may 
come into play in deciding whether patent law preempts state law concerning IP.  First, 
courts should consider whether Congress has given any “affirmative indication” whether 
state law is “consistent with federal policy.”131 Second, courts should consider whether 
 
parallel between physical security and copyright, data and other digital world security issues in the case of 
computer IO raises a question of whether the latter are so important that RE should be circumscribed.  In 
effect, Congress considered this issue when enacting section 1201and the very narrow RE exception of 
section 1201(f) in two ways: (1) nothing in section 1201(f) entitles the lawful reverse engineer the right to 
publish (as contrasted with use) IO (thus limiting Chicago Lock to use not disclosure); and (2) the risk of 
misuse of security IO by third parties may be controlled by enforcing a restrictive contract against 
outsourcing RE to discover IO.  See discussion supra Part IV.B).  
127 395 U.S. 653 (1969). 
128 See id.
129 Id. at 672. 
130 Cf., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 560-61 (1973)(As part of reasoning that California regulation 
of unauthorized recordings was not preempted by Copyright law, the Court noted that state regulation is 
much more limited than the pervasive exclusive nationwide monopoly rights granted by Congress because 
the state law was “confined to its [California’s] borders.”  This is not the case with a mass market RE 
prohibition, where, as in Bowers, Davidson and ProCD, discussed infra at Part III D, the licenses include 
choice of law rules such that the contract has national-wide effect (as opposed to the state border limits of 
the California regulation in Goldstein). 
131 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165-66 (1989).  See also Goldstein v. 
California, 412 U.S. 546, 571 (1973); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 494 (1974) 
(Marshall, J. concurring) (trade secret law not preempted by patent law because it has “co-existed for many, 
many years [and] [d]uring this time, Congress has repeatedly demonstrated its full awareness of the 
existence of the trade secret system, without any indication of disapproval. . . .[thus no] ‘evidence of a 
congressional design to pre-empt the field’.”)(quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 
132, 141 (1963). 
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there is a real or hypothetical risk that the policies which underlie federal law will be 
jeopardized by state regulatory competition providing equivalent IP in the federal 
system.132 
C. Patent Preemption of Mass Market License Restrictions on 
Discovery and Use of Interoperability Information 
 
Careful application of all five of the Kewanee and Bonito Boat patent preemption 
factors to the case of mass market contract restrictions on RE for purposes of developing 
an interoperable product strongly suggests that patent preemption is required.   
First, if a mass market license restricts RE, then the traditional and fundamental 
trade secret rule that a product may be reverse engineered to ascertain secrets is not met 
because the only way to obtain the software is with the license.133 Yet the ability to 
acquire the product in which inheres the secrets without a contract restriction underlies 
the Court’s reasoning in Kewanee and Bonito Boats.
For example, in Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 134 cited with approval in 
Kewanee,135 the licensee of the trade secret had the alternative of acquiring the product in 
the marketplace without any RE restriction.  Judge Friendly, writing for the Second 
Circuit, enforced a negotiated trade secret license.  In doing so, he noted how a license 
agreement is different from the rights covered by patent law because a license does not 
operate against the world, but rather just the licensee: 
An agreement licensing a trade secret is an altogether different matter.  It 
binds no one except the licensee; all others are free, as the licensee 
previously was, to attempt by fair means to figure out what the secret is 
and, if they succeed, to practice it.(n.5)136 
In footnote five, Judge Friendly highlighted that the licensee, without being subject to a 
license, was free to acquire the product on the market and RE it: 
As Bourns [the trade secret claimant] suggests, there was nothing to 
prevent Painton, before it entered into the agreement, or anyone else, from 
prying open the unpatented Bourns potentiometers, ascertaining the 
arrangement of the parts, and copying this. 137 
Most directly on point is the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Chicago Lock,138 quoted 
with approval in Bonito Boats.139 As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that 
 
132 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
133 See supra Part II.B. 
134 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971). 
135 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
136 Painton, 442 F.2d at 223. 
137 Id. at 223 n.5. 
138 See Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1982). 
139 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989). 
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patent preemption would apply if California trade secret law imposed an obligation 
against the public which precluded RE of the key codes needed to operate plaintiff’s 
locks.  Enforcement under state contract law of a mass market term restricting RE for 
interoperability purposes is just a different means of using state law to bar RE for 
interoperability.  It is hard to see why a court implied obligation should be at greater risk 
of patent preemption than a mass market, non-negotiated, contract term with the same 
effect. 
Second, if a mass market license restriction is enforced, the only way to obtain the 
software in which inheres the interface information is by virtue of a non-negotiated mass 
market license which now also inheres as part of the software code.140 The very nature of 
enforcement in the mass market context transforms what had been an in personam right 
effectively into a right “against the world.”141 Professor Lemley aptly captured this 
problem in considering proposed UCC 2B: 
Because of this shift [to general enforcement of mass market licenses], 
contracts under Article 2B are really more akin to property rights:  the 
contracts can be viewed as equitable servitudes that “run with” the goods 
in much the same way that some property owners once tried to impose 
restrictions on chattel.  This shift is extremely important.  The existing 
relationship between intellectual property and contract law is based on a 
conception of what constitutes an enforceable contract.  Article 2B 
changes that conception; as a result, it cannot help but change the 
relationship as well. 142 
The Drafters of UCITA recognized the potential effect of a non-negotiated mass 
market license on the fundamental freedom to RE embodied in state trade secret law by 
identifying it as a potential candidate for application of the fundamental public policy 
grounds for invalidating such a restriction where it precludes use of IO.143 
As discussed infra at Part IV A, the Federal Circuit Courts have consistently 
rejected copyright claims to prohibit RE by decompilation and disassembly of software to 
bar discovery and use of IO because copyright enforcement would be tantamount to 
creation of a “de facto monopoly” resulting in “patent-like protection”.  Likewise, 
Chicago Lock reasons that an implied trade secrecy obligation preventing disassembly to 
obtain interoperation information impermissibly “converts . . . a trade secret into a state-
conferred monopoly akin to the absolute protection that a patent affords.”   
An enforceable shrink-wrap or web wrap term running with distribution of 
publicly available software (because the license is now part of the software) has the same 
 
140 See infra Part II.A.   
141 See discussion of ProCD, infra text accompanying notes 189-201. 
142 Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL.
L. REV. 111, 118-24 (1999).  See also Reichman & Franklin, supra note 72. 
143 See discussion infra Part IV A. 
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practical effect.144 If use of copyright law or trade secret law (Chicago Lock) to prevent 
use of IO conflicts with patent law, use of state contract law to acquire “patent-like 
protection” would equally conflict with and frustrate the purposes and objects of patent 
law.145 In addition, since mass market contracts typically include choice of law 
provisions, the geographical scope of the patent-like protection is nation-wide, and thus is 
more troubling than the Florida-only reach of the statute in Bonito Boats.146 
For these reasons, a mass market shrink or web wrap license bears absolutely no 
resemblance to the two-party negotiated contracts that the Kewanee and Painton courts 
were contemplating when they held that trade secret law was “much weaker” than patent 
law. 
Third, enforcement of RE clauses against a party seeking to discover IO results in 
the detection paradox discussed in Part II C above.  The detection paradox is that a party 
who reverse engineers to learn interface secrets to develop an interoperable program is 
more likely to be detected than a party who reverse engineers solely to clone a product.  
Once the interoperable product is introduced into the market, the fact that it can 
interoperate with the original product is a red flag for detection.  Yet Kewanee makes 
clear that one reason trade secret law is weaker is because trade secret misappropriation is 
“not easily susceptible of discovery or proof.”147 But that is not the case with IO, where 
the interoperability feature of the interoperable program enables easy detection.   Thus, 
sieve-like potential for leakage of secret IO is sealed to a large extent due to ready 
detection in the marketplace.148 
Fourth, Congress has indicated in section 1201(f) of the DMCA a federal policy 
supporting RE to discover and use IO.149 This is the type of “affirmative action” by 
Congress that the Supreme Court has indicated is relevant in finding the appropriate 
balance between federal patent and copyright law and permissible state protection of 
trade secrets.150 
144 See discussion supra Part II A, text accompanying notes 41 and 42, and infra Part III D. 
145 This precise reasoning was raised by amici to support copyright conflicts preemption in Bowers v. 
Baystate Technologies, Inc. See Brief for of Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 302 F.3d 1334, (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) (No. 91-40079)(Brief at p. 14).  Although the reasoning is persuasive, it is arguably misplaced as 
applied to copyright - as contrasted with patent law - preemption. 
146 This also raises the Dormant IP clause concern of Burger, C.J. in Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 
558 (1973)(considering whether state regulation “will prejudice the interests of other States [rather than 
effect protection] within its boundaries” in discussion of IP Clause preemption).  See supra note 82. 
147 416 U.S. 470, 489-90 (1974). 
148 Professor Frederic Meeker questioned whether such leakage is present due to the potential outsourcing 
of RE to one of the jurisdictions discussed infra at Part VI.  However, the question is whether it is legal to 
discover and use IO in the U.S.  Since the answer is no (at best one might be able to discover it in an 
interoperability-friendly jurisdiction, and then use the IO in a product in the U.S., see supra note 279, but 
not publish the information), it would be ironic if leakage by virtue of international outsourcing at the 
expense of U.S. industry was what the Kewanee court had in mind). 
149 See discussion infra at Part IV.B. 
150 See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 493. 
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Fifth, there is competition in regulation of IO by virtue of the recent rulings of the 
Eighth, and Federal Circuits applying California and Massachusetts law and risk of 
similar rulings by misapplication of the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in ProCD.151 
In sum, applying the Kewanee and Bonito Boats patent preemption factors to 
mass market license restrictions on RE for interoperability purposes strongly suggests 
that patent law should preempt contract law when it is merely an instrument to try to 
patentize trade secret information.152 In trying to draw a reasonable line between the 
policy of freedom of contract to prevent free riding by cloning trade secrets153 and the 
competing interests in competition and interoperability, limiting patent preemption or 
state public policy invalidation to the narrow case of terms preventing RE for 
interoperability best balances the competing interests, and is consistent with recent 
Congressional intent reflected in Section 1201(f) of the DMCA.154 
Only one case has even peripherally touched upon this issue.  In DVD Copy 
Control Ass’n  v. Bunner,155 the Supreme Court of California reversed a Court of Appeal 
ruling that dissolved a preliminary injunction against website operators who had 
allegedly trade secret material which would enable decrypting DVD copy control on their 
sites or linked to other sites with such information.  In remanding the case, the California 
Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeal had to “’make an independent examination 
of the entire record’ and determine whether the evidence in the record supports the 
factual findings necessary to establish that the preliminary injunction was warranted 
under California’s trade secret law.”156 The majority assumed but did not decide that the 
initial acquisition of the secret IO by Jan Johansen violated the plaintiff’s shrinkwrap 
license.157 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Moreno agreed that the Court of Appeal needed 
“to clarify how the prior restraint doctrine under the First Amendment applies to the 
publication of alleged trade secrets.”158 However, Justice Moreno also ruled that there 
was no need for further proceedings because the plaintiff’s trade secret claim was 
“patently without merit”159 because the information was no longer still secret.  In addition, 
he noted in a final footnote that the information was likely acquired through proper 
means by RE the software: 
 
151 See discussion infra Part IV.D. 
152 This analysis may also be appropriate in any case where a non-negotiated license is used to try to obtain 
a patent-like monopoly on information, particularly where the information is functional in nature. 
153 Arguably these are the “procompetitive functions” of shrink wrap contracts to preserve trade secrets 
identified by Judge Easterbrook.  See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996). 
154 See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
155 31 Cal. 4th 864 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2003). 
156 Id. at 890. 
157 Id. at 875, n. 5 (“Therefore, we need not decide . . . whether Johansen acquired the trade secrets by 
improper means when he reverse engineered the Xing software in violation of a license agreement.”) 
158 Id. at 891. 
159 Id. 
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I also note that it is highly doubtful the alleged trade secret was acquired 
by improper means within the meaning of the trade secret law. Civil Code 
section 3426.1, subdivision (a), defining "improper means," states 
"[r]everse engineering ... alone shall not be considered  
improper means." Apparently the word "alone" refers to the fact that the 
item reverse engineered would have to be obtained "by a fair and honest 
means, such as purchase of the item on the open market for reverse 
engineering to be lawful." (Legis. Com. Com., 12A pt. 1 West's Ann. 
Civ.Code, supra, foll. Civ.Code, § 3426.1, p. 238, quoting Rest. Torts § 
757, com. (f).) According to the allegations of the complaint, the alleged 
initial misappropriator of CSS, Jon Johannsen, acquired the secret through 
reverse engineering. There is no allegation that he acquired the product 
containing CSS unlawfully, and that therefore improper means were 
employed. The DVD CCA argument below that violation of a "click 
license" agreement prohibiting reverse engineering constituted the 
improper means does not appear to have merit. To be sure, contract plays 
an important role in trade secret law by protecting the trade secret holder 
against "unauthorized use or disclosure through a contract with the 
recipient of a disclosure " or others who have had special access to trade 
secret information, via confidentiality agreements and the like. (Rest.3d 
Unfair Competition, § 41, com. d, p. 471, italics added.) But nowhere has 
it been recognized that a party wishing to protect proprietary information 
may employ a consumer form contract to, in effect, change the statutory 
definition of "improper means" under trade secret law to include reverse  
engineering, so that an alleged trade secret holder may bring an action 
even against a nonparty to that contract. Moreover, if trade secret law did 
allow alleged trade secret holders to redefine "improper means" to include 
reverse engineering, it would likely be preempted by federal patent law, 
which alone grants universal protection for a limited time against the right 
to reverse engineer. (See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. 
(1989) 489 U.S. 141, 155, 109 S.Ct. 971, 103 L.Ed.2d 118.)160 
Other than this discussion in a footnote in a concurring decision, to date there 
have only been broad based arguments by commentators about patent preemption for 
mass market license RE restrictions.  Over a decade ago, Professor Rice relied upon the 
second Kewanee factor—that trade secrets do not operate “against the world”-- to argue 
that all mass market license restrictions on RE of software should be preempted by patent 
law:  
Shrink-wrap license prohibitions against reverse engineering alter the 
operation of those [trade secret] liability rules and the public policies 
which they reflect in a manner that accomplishes exclusion that 
substantially enhances trade secret law, making it more like patent law 
 
160 Id. at 901. 
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without the disclosure requirement and temporal limit of federal law.  It is 
that effect which poses the prospect of patent law preemption.161 
Professor Lemley also raised the specter of patent preemption, yet ultimately 
found it unsatisfying because “[p]atent [p]reemption [l]acks [n]uance.” 162 Professor 
Reichman and Jonathan Franklin noted in passing that “[i]n an ideal world, perhaps, an 
enlightened preemption doctrine might ask the right questions”, but then quickly rejected 
it as politically impractical and too “wooden” a doctrinal tool.163 
However, a careful reading of Judge Friendly’s opinion in Painton suggests that 
courts can apply patent preemption to portions of mass market license clauses in a 
nuanced and enlightened way.  Judge Friendly recognized in dicta that were patent 
preemption to apply with respect to an agreement, a court “might be willing to recognize 
aspects of the agreement less offensive to the policy of the patent laws. . . .”  Accordingly, 
a court might utilize a time honored approach of blue penciling a contract clause to avoid 
only that which is contrary to patent law.164 Even Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in ProCD 
leaves open the prospect that a particular contract case might necessitate application of 
preemption.165 
To avoid any misunderstanding it is critical to highlight how circumscribed patent 
preemption of contract law would be under this analysis.  First, negotiated contracts 
would be unaffected.  Second, only to the extent a non-negotiated mass market clause is 
interpreted to bar discovery and use of IO might it be preempted.166 Thus, a court would 
preempt a clause insofar as it extended to discovery and use of IO, yet otherwise enforce 
the clause.167 To highlight why this approach makes sense a comparison of two licenses 
is appropriate:  (1) a license of IO for a limited purpose and subject to an obligation of 
secrecy; and (2) a non-negotiated mass market license of object code software subject to 
a prohibition against RE to learn IO solely to develop an independent program 
interoperable with the licensed program.   
 
161 Rice, supra note 65.  But see Koffshy, supra note 68 (rejecting patent preemption without any detailed 
analysis of Kewanee reasoning).  See also commentators mentioned supra note 102. 
162 Lemley, supra note 142, at 145 (arguing on a general review of the Supreme Court cases  that 
“[p]reemption [l]acks [n]uance”). 
163 Reichman & Franklin, supra note 72, at 920-22.   
164 See discussion of UCITA Section 105 infra Part V.A. 
165 See discussion infra Part IV.D. 
166 Professor Jane Ginsburg also raised an interesting scenario—what if a party, as in ProCD, offered 
different versions (at different prices) of the product wherein the consumer version (at a lower price) 
prohibited RE for interoperability purposes and a business version (at a higher price) did not prohibit such 
activity.  Would the restriction in the consumer version be preempted?  Although one could say this 
presents a case at the borderline, the stronger argument would appear to be that the consumer version 
should not be preempted because it does not prevent the world from RE the product—a party could 
lawfully acquire the business version and reverse engineer it to discover the IO. 
167 In addition, the interoperability developer would need to proceed very carefully in discovering and 
documenting the necessary IO to avoid claims of either copyright infringement or misuse of trade secret 
information other than IO.  For this reason, the interoperabilty developer might utilize additional 
procedures to evidence that it only accessed and used the IO it would be entitled to use.  See, e.g., the clean 
room procedures used by Accolade in Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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Nothing in the application of the Kewanee and Bonito Boats factors raises doubts 
as to the enforceability of a license of secret IO.  In such a case the subject of the license 
would be the information, not the software product (as in example 2).  Thus enforcement 
of license 1 would not run afoul of the proposed patent preemption analysis168 but would 
in fact further the permissible state policy of encouraging controlled dissemination of 
information by licensing of trade secrets recognized in Kewanee.169 A competitor would 
remain free to RE the software for interoperability purposes.  Thus, there is no risk of 
creation of a property right against the world in such information.  In contrast the 
restriction in license 2 goes to the heart of the concerns about patent law discussed above 
and would frustrate the patent regime.  As such, enforcement by state courts should be 
preempted. 
In addition, the Supreme Court’s reasoning would support enforcement of a 
shrink- or web-wrap term prohibiting RE extending to IO during product development.170 
In preempting the Florida statute, the Supreme Court in Bonito Boats noted that trade 
secret protection is most important during the product development stage, rather than 
after the product enters the market: 
 
The Florida statute substantially reduces this competitive incentive 
[available via reverse engineering], thus eroding the general rule of free 
competition upon which the attractiveness of the federal patent bargain 
depends.  The protections of state trade secret law are most effective at the 
developmental stage, before a product has been marketed and the threat of 
reverse engineering becomes real.171 
Thus, even non-negotiated licenses accompanying limited distribution of an alpha, 
beta or other pre-market launch test versions of software could contain an enforceable 
term prohibiting access to IO.  The reasons are clear:  (1) the length of the restriction is 
almost certain to be much shorter than the patent term; and (2) the restriction does not 
conflict with the fundamental trade secret limiting principle of freedom to RE a product 
generally available in the marketplace.172 
168 See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979) (negotiated license of trade secrets subject 
to patent application not preempted even where payment obligation extended beyond time when application 
rejected since licensee obtained first to market benefit and expressly negotiated rate based upon possibility 
that no patent would issue in certain period of time). 
 
169 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 486-87 (1974).  See also Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 
442 F.2d 216, 225 (2d Cir. 1971) (“sharing of technological know-how on the basis of proper agreements 
has been beneficial not only within this country but in its relations with others”); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 
86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (referring to the “procompetitive effect” of contract law in protecting trade 
secrets). 
170 See also Aronson, discussed supra note 167. 
171 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 161 (1989). 
172 Obviously there might be some scenario where a closed technologist mischaracterized its ongoing 
distribution of a product as being still “in development”, but that would simply require a court to look 
beyond a party’s potentially self-serving characterization of its distribution.  
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One issue is whether patent preemption should apply to IO which is not in fact 
patentable.  The Kewanee Court specifically considered and rejected a “partial 
preemption” approach because it would “impose the almost impossible burden on state 
courts to determine the patentability-in-fact of an invention.”173 
In view of the above arguments, it seems curious that no court has directly 
considered this patent preemption analysis.  One is left wondering why the recent debate 
among commentators, litigants, and the courts has been limited primarily to copyright 
preemption of contract law.  In retrospect, perhaps the reason for the focus on copyright 
and contract was due to uncertainty over the availability patent protection for computer 
software.174 However, with that issue now resolved in the affirmative, it seems clear that 
the focus should shift. 
Given the availability of patent protection for interoperability related aspects of 
software, a fresh read of Kewanee, Bonito Boats and the other patent preemption cases 
discussed above provides a sufficiently nuanced, enlightened, and pragmatic approach 
which would invoke patent preemption of RE prohibitions only to the extent that they bar 
discovery of IO.  Applying this new lens to extant cases shows how analysis and 
outcomes may be affected.   
D. Applying Patent Preemption Lens to Recent Decisions:  Bowers, 
Davidson, ProCD 
Changing the lens from the current copyright/contract preemption debate to a 
focus on the interplay of patent, trade secret policy, and contract law as an instrument for 
protecting trade secrets provides a new way for courts to consider the matter.  In sum, the 
appropriate hierarchy for protection of IO is patent primacy, with weaker trade secret 
protection, including use of contract law as an instrument of that weaker protection.  But 
where enforcement of a particular term would result in stronger state protection than the 
federal patent regime, the term must be preempted.175 Such is the case of non-negotiated 
mass market licenses restricting discovery and use of IO. 
The proper approach for courts is first to determine if a reasonable interpretation 
avoids the clash of policies.  As such, courts may simply interpret narrowly terms 
restricting RE solely to cover activity directed at discovering secrets to clone features (as 
contrasted with activity to learn interfaces for interoperability purposes), in light of the 
underlying competing federal and state trade secret policy considerations which 
 
173 Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 492. 
174 See, e.g., Reichman & Franklin, supra note 72, at 940 (characterizing compatibility information as 
“unpatentable . . . ideas”).  
175 Interestingly, Professor Miller, supra note 77 , at 772,  recently raised concerns about enforcing 
shrinkwrap licenses such as those presented in Bowers, infra note 176,  and ProCD, supra note 11, without 
court scrutiny of de facto monopoly risks:  “Those courts should have determined whether the restrictive 
contracts at issue provided the sellers with de facto idea monopolies.”  Ironically, Professor Miller did not 
cite to Davidson, infra at note 184, arguably the most troubling case in terms of effecting a de facto 
monopoly on IO, whereas both Bowers and ProCD may not present the de facto monopoly risk when 
analyzed using the patent preemption 5 factor test suggested in this Article.  
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potentially conflict with contract law.  If such interpretation is not feasible,176 then the 
contract law exception for competing public policy analysis should be employed. 177 It is 
only as a last resort that courts should address the patent preemption.   
Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc.178 presents a case where a copyright 
preemption/contract focus has left ambiguities on the question of whether a mass market 
term can bar RE to discover and use IO.   
In Bowers, the Federal Circuit enforced a mass market restriction on RE 
notwithstanding a claim of copyright preemption.  Factually, it appears to be a case of 
cloning.179 The defendant reverse engineered the plaintiff’s product to copy its 
functionality, but there is no reference to any IO. In ruling that the shrink wrap license 
term restricting RE was not preempted by copyright, the court held that there was an 
extra element in the contract beyond what copyright covered—that extra element was the 
contract-created duty not to discover and use the uncopyrightable trade secret ideas which 
inhered in the software.   
In adopting the reasoning of ProCD and enforcing the contract, the court’s 
decision sheds minimal light on a case involving IO.  Arguably, the court reserved 
judgment: 
In making this determination, this court has left untouched the conclusions 
reached in Atari Games v. Nintendo regarding reverse engineering as a 
statutory fair use exception to copyright infringement. Atari Games Corp. 
v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 24 USPQ 1015 (Fed. Cir. 
1992).  In Atari, this court stated that, with respect to 17 U.S.C. § 107 (fair 
use section of the Copyright Act), “[t]he legislative history of section 107 
suggests that courts should adapt the fair use exception to accommodate 
new technological innovations.”  Atari, 975 F.2d at 843.  This court noted 
“[a] prohibition on all copying whatsoever would stifle the free flow of 
ideas without serving any legitimate interest of the copyright holder.”  Id. 
Therefore, this court held “reverse engineering object code to discern the 
unprotectable ideas in a computer program is a fair use.” Id. Application 
of the First Circuit’s view distinguishing a state law contract claim having 
 
176 Arguably the only scenario where this would have to occur would be the presence of contract language 
such as:  
 Notwithstanding any other laws or policies or any other provisions of this agreement to 
the contrary, the licensee shall under no circumstances reverse engineer the licensed 
product for purposes of discovery of interoperability information necessary to and 
otherwise unavailable for the licensee to develop an interoperable product. 
177 See discussion infra Part V.A. 
178 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 539 U.S.928 (2003). 
179 Bowers is a factually complex case because the defendant was copying aspects of the plaintiff’s program 
related to the user interface of the program.  However there were no issues about data formats or IO as used 
in this article.  See definition supra at Part II B.  The Bowers court notes: “The record also contains 
evidence of extensive and unusual similarities between Geodraft and the accused Draft-Pak–further 
evidence of reverse engineering.”  Id.
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additional elements of proof from a copyright claim does not alter the 
findings of Atari. Likewise, this claim distinction does not conflict with 
the expressly defined circumstances in which reverse engineering is not 
copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (section of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act) and 17 U.S.C. § 906 (section directed to mask 
works).180 
The Federal Circuit’s discussion of the distinction between copyright and use of contract 
law to prevent misappropriation of trade secrets may be all that the court intended by 
stating that it was not altering the copyright decision in Atari. However, the reference to 
section 1201(f) of the DMCA may be more telling because that section expresses 
Congressional intent to override contract in certain cases involving RE to discover and 
use IO.181 Read from this perspective, the court’s statement that the “claim distinction 
[between contract and copyright] does not conflict with the expressly defined 
circumstances in which RE is no copyright infringement under [1201(f)]” may be the 
court’s way of expressly recognizing that RE for purposes of interoperability was not 
being considered. 
In interpreting the specific clause, the Bowers court stated: 
In this case, the contract unambiguously prohibits “reverse engineering.”  
That term means ordinarily “to study or analyze (a device, as a microchip 
for computers) in order to learn details of design, construction, and 
operation, perhaps to produce a copy or an improved version.”  Thus, the 
contract in this case broadly prohibits any “reverse engineering” of the 
subject matter covered by the shrink-wrap agreement.182 
The court went on to state, “The shrink-wrap license agreement prohibited, inter alia, all 
reverse engineering of Mr. Bowers’ software, protection encompassing but more 
extensive than copyright protection, which prohibits only certain copying.”183 
There are two ways to interpret the court’s reasoning.  One is that the court 
enforced a contract to prevent RE to discover all ideas unprotectable by copyright, which 
would include IO.  A second reading is simply that a mass market license is enforceable 
to prevent RE of trade secrets which inhere in software other than IO (i.e., to prevent 
cloning functionality generally).   
It is unfortunate that the court’s use of the phrase “all reverse engineering” 
arguably comports better with the former view which would preclude discovery and use 
of IO—an interpretation in conflict with the patent preemption analysis outline above.   
 
180 Id.
181 See discussion supra Part IV.B.  
182 Id. at PP.(citations omitted). 
183 Id.
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Had the court been presented with the issue from the patent preemption/trade 
secret perspective suggested in this article, it very well may have provided greater 
attention to its interpretation of the contract clause and explicitly construed it to exclude 
IO to avoid a patent preemption risk.  Nonetheless, the issue was not before the court and 
the finding of breach of an enforceable contract term is consistent with the analysis 
suggested in this article (i.e. that courts should enforce mass market prohibitions on RE 
for purposes of cloning functionality generally).   
Interestingly, Judge Dyk’s dissent captures the key distinction between 
individually negotiated terms and those subsumed in a mass market license but which 
may be at odds with other policies184: "I nonetheless agree with the majority opinion that 
a state can permit parties to contract away a fair use defense or to agree not to engage in 
uses of copyrighted material that are permitted by the copyright law, if the contract is 
freely negotiated."  Unfortunately Judge Dyk limited his disagreement solely to the 
debate of balancing federal copyright policy vis a vis state contract policy (which 
includes use of contract as an instrument to enforce a trade secret).  As such, the opinion 
did not address the critical issue of considering either federal patent law or other public 
policies to determine the appropriate scope of state trade secrets rights and their 
enforcement by contract law.   
In sum, Bowers is worth reconsidering from this new perspective.  Ironically, the 
court’s focus on federal copyright policy vis a vis state freedom of contract policy may be 
due to defendant’s failure to plead patent preemption.  For whatever reason, there is no 
discussion of the critical issue of whether enforcing a RE prohibition clause in a mass 
market context upsets the fundamental trade secret principle concerning RE products in 
the marketplace and impermissibly conflicts with patent law.185 Since the case did not 
involve IO, it is distinguishable on its facts. 
Davidson186 is yet another case stuck in the copyright/freedom of contract rut.  
Once again, as in Bowers, the focus on copyright theories (preemption, misuse) may stem 
from a failure to recognize the key role of patent law.  Ironically, this focus by the court 
again may simply be due to defendant’s failure to plead patent preemption as a 
defense.187 
In Davidson, the defendants asserted that they reverse engineered solely to 
discover protocols and other format information needed to build server software which 
would interoperate with Davidson’s software.  However, the record is unclear if 
defendants discovered and used any other secret information beyond that which was 
 
184 Id.
185 Interestingly, an amici brief filed in the Court of Appeal hints at this issue but approaches it from a 
copyright conflicts preemption analysis.  See supra note 145.  Again, this could be due to the failure to 
plead a patent preemption defense. 
186 Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005). 
187 See Defendants Amended Answer and Counterclaims to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint.  
http://www.eff.org/IP/Emulation/Blizzard_v_bnetd/20021204_counterclaims_SAC.pdf (last visited January 
20, 2006). 
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needed for interoperability.188 If the defendants’ and plaintiff’s products were 
functionally similar, but that occurred from external intelligent observation by 
defendants, then there would not appear to be any basis for claiming contract breach (i.e. 
misappropriation of a trade secret) solely due to defendants’ RE of plaintiff’s software to 
discover IO.189 
The point is that patent, copyright, and trade secret law and policy support 
overriding a non-negotiated mass market restriction to the extent the defendants obtained 
and used only IO.  If the contract term was enforced to prevent use of such information, 
then the fundamental balance between the incentives available under the limited term and 
scope of patent law would potentially be outweighed by the reward offered by state 
enforcement of the clause:  a “de facto monopoly” of potentially perpetual duration to 
exclude others from discovering IO whose use in an interoperable product is readily 
detectable in the marketplace because of its compatibility feature. 
However, if discovery and use of Davidson’s secrets extended beyond the narrow 
field of functional IO which strikes at the core of federal patent and copyright law, 
defendants were properly held accountable to the contract restriction. 
Finally, ProCD must be considered since it is so broadly cited for the general 
proposition that mass market license terms are enforceable.  At the outset, the rule 
adopted in ProCD is worth stating: “Shrinkwrap licenses are enforceable unless their 
terms are objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in general (for example, if they 
violate a rule of positive law, or if they are unconscionable).”190 At a minimum, the case 
is not directly on point since the defendant was not seeking to RE the software to 
discover and use IO.191 As such, it was not a case which necessarily implicated patent 
preemption.  In addition, the recognition that “general” grounds of exception to contract 
enforcement are applicable to shrink-wrap licenses expressly reserves the prospect that a 
public policy192 or patent preemption could apply in a future case.   In fact, Judge 
Easterbrook very carefully made clear that a situation could be presented where 
preemption might apply to a private contract:   
Like the Supreme Court in Wolens, we think it prudent to refrain from 
adopting a rule that anything with the label “contract” is necessarily 
 
188 The plaintiff argued in the district court that defendants “copied elements that would preserve player 
account information, display of icons and presentation of banners” and the court found that “defendant’s 
action constituted more than enabling interoperability.”  (Sept. 30, 2004 Order at 32).   RE any such non-
interoperability secrets would be impermissible under the analysis put forward in this Article. 
189 Arguably the district court may have had a misinformed view of what copyright protects because the 
court considered the fact that defendants server was a “functional alternative” to plaintiff’s software was 
within the “realm of copyright infringement.” Id. at 32. 
190 ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1448 (7th. Cir. 1996). 
191 In fact, the holding is consistent with the view expressed supra text accompanying notes 1687-69, that 
enforcement by state law of licenses of information is consistent with Supreme Court teachings, and as 
such provides the rationale for a limited purpose license of IO. 
192 See infra Part V.A.  
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outside the preemption clause:  the variations are too numerous to 
foresee.193 
The challenge with ProCD is that a careful analysis of Judge Easterbrook’s 
reasoning and dicta highlights questions on the issue of whether a shrink-wrap license is 
enforceable “against the world” as contemplated by the Kewanee and Bonito Boat 
decisions in the context of a non-negotiated mass market license restriction on RE to 
discover and use IO in 2006.  In addition there is language suggesting that a RE 
prohibition is consistent with trade secret law.194 Since the language is merely dicta, 
there is nothing to prevent reconsideration of these issues in a case which directly raises 
the issue of enforcement of a mass-market clause which bars discovery and use of IO to 
preclude development of an independent interoperable product.   
The central assumption implicit in Judge’s Easterbrook’s conclusion that the 
ProCD shrink-wrap was not a public right enforceable “against the world”  but rather a 
private contract right was that one can actually find software available on the street 
without an enforceable contract term.  Thus he reasons: 
Rights ‘equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope 
of copyright’ are rights established by law—rights that restrict the options 
of persons who are strangers to the author.  Copyright law forbids 
duplication, public performance, and so on, unless the person wishing to 
copy or perform the work gets permission; silence means a ban on 
copying.  A copyright is a right against the world.  Contracts, by contrast, 
generally affect only their parties;  strangers may do as they please, so 
contracts do not create ‘exclusive rights.’  Someone who found a copy of 
[plaintiff’s software product which included telephone listings] on the 
street would not be affected by the shrink-wrap license—though the 
federal copyright laws of their own force would limit the finder’s ability to 
copy or transmit the application program.195 
Several points are worth noting about this analysis as applied to patent preemption 
of a term preventing RE to discover and use IO.  Amazingly, they all stem from the 
assumption that “strangers … who [find] . . . cop[ies] of [software] on the street would 
not be affected by the shrink-wrap license.”   
The reason the “strangers on the street” assumption is so critical is that whether 
such “strangers” are real or fictional in 2006 lies at the heart of the reasoning in Kewanee 
and Bonito Boats.196 First, the freedom to RE a product available in the marketplace 
without being subject to a contract restriction—the first Kewanee factor—is satisfied in 
 
193 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454. 
194 Id. at 1455 (“To the extent licenses facilitate distribution of object code while concealing the source 
code (the point of a clause forbidding disassembly), they serve the same procompetitive functions as does 
the law of trade secrets.”)  Although this is true in the case of source code information generally, it is not 
true of IO because of the teachings of Kewanee and Bonito Boats, discussed supra Part IV C. 
195 Id. 
196 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
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the case of software by ProCD’s “strangers on the street”.  Second, Kewanee made clear 
that if a state law is enforceable “against the world” it may be at risk of patent 
preemption.  It is only by existence of the “strangers on the street” that the shrink-wrap 
license in ProCD is not enforceable against the world. 
Thus to satisfy two of the Kewanee factors the existence of “strangers on the 
street” who are free of any contract restriction are critical.  The problem with software is 
that ProCD’s “strangers on the street” have become, in the real world of software 
distribution in 2006—virtual, not real, strangers.  This is due to the dramatic changes in 
the way in which software is now typically made available to the public.  The copy of the 
ProCD software which is assumed to be available to “strangers on the street” is a relic of 
a now outmoded approach to distribution of software.  No one merely includes a sheet of 
paper printed with the license in a box which separately contains a disk on which resides 
the object code version of the software.  Today, even in the case of tangible copies of 
software available for distribution (and thus theoretically available for strangers to pick 
up on the street) the software itself typically includes the license.197 In the increasingly 
common context of web distribution, the license is part of the software and affirmative 
assent by electronic keystroke to the terms is a prerequisite to access to the software.198 
In addition, the new claim under section 1202 of the DMCA for altering copyright 
management information creates a separate cause of action against anyone who attempts 
to strip the license terms from the software.199 The point is in the increasingly prevalent 
era of digital availability via the internet, the license is part of the code and the federal 
law of Section 1202 bars its separation.   As such, ProCD’s “strangers” have become 
entirely fictional because no one can practically gain access to software without 
encountering the license.   
Finally, since no issue of patent preemption was raised, Judge Easterbrook’s 
passing comments in ProCD about Kewanee are just that—dicta.  The case did not 
require scrutiny of the Kewanee and Bonito Boats factors to determine whether a state 
contract term might result in a “de facto monopoly” right equivalent to or stronger than a 
patent.200 It is for this reason that his dictum about the “procompetitive functions” of a 
shrink wrap RE prohibition on software should not be misinterpreted.  He was not 
presented with an argument that such a clause was extending to IO as contrasted with 
other trade secret source code information.  Had that been the case, then reliance on 
Kewanee and Bonito Boats would have presented the case which he hypothesized—i.e., a 
“variation[] or possibilit[y] [the court could not] foresee” that might lead to 
preemption.201 
In sum, the holding of ProCD is not inconsistent with the patent preemption and 
public policy analysis presented in this article.  In addition and more importantly, the 
reasoning of ProCD is not helpful in analyzing some of the issues presented in this article 
 
197 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
198 See Reichman & Franklin, supra text at note 72. 
199 17 U.S.C. §1202 (2001). 
200 See discussion supra Part III.C. 
201 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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for two reasons.  First, the fundamental assumption in ProCD concerning the manner in 
which software is made available to the public no longer reflects marketplace reality in 
2006 because software is not typically available distinct from its license.202 Second, 
since ProCD solely raised copyright preemption—which this author suggests is 
inapposite to the question of contractual control of discovery and use of IO--dicta on 
Kewanee and Bonito Boat in ProCD understandably do not reflect the detailed teachings 
of those cases in the case of patent preemption. 
Interestingly, the patent preemption analysis suggested in this Article may provide 
a reasoned approach to ProCD and the broader issue of the bounds imposed by federal 
intellectual property law on use of contract (or some other form of state regulation) to 
control access to and use of useful data.  Arguably, the question is dependent upon the 
patent preemption factors outlined in Part III C:  (1) whether state regulation results in a 
de facto patent-like monopoly in such data, (2) whether there is impermissible regulatory 
competition in IP for functional data in the federal system, and (3) whether Congress has 
expressed any intent in terms of the role of federal vs state regulation of such useful 
information. 203 If enforcement of the contract term is tantamount to a patent-like 
monopoly, and there is a real risk of regulatory competition, then the risk of patent 
preemption is great.  Since there were other sources of the uncopyrightable data 
compilation in ProCD, there was no risk that enforcement of the contract was tantamount 
to a state monopoly in the data.  This approach is also consistent with the underlying 
reasoning of Judge Posner in Assessment Technologies v. WireDATA, Inc.204 where he 
strongly suggested that use of a mass market software license to effectively control 
access to and use of public domain data very well might be copyright misuse because it 
could effect monopoly type control over the data. 
Unfortunately, one reading of Bowers, Davidson and ProCD may lead some to 
conclude – erroneously in this author’s opinion--that mass market license terms 
restricting RE to discover and use IO are enforceable and consistent with federal policy.  
For the reasons discussed above, this conclusion is solely because courts have undertaken 
a copyright, rather than patent and state trade secret, policy and preemption analysis.   
 
202 If a case arose where plaintiff could show that there was some realistic manner by which a stranger 
could lawfully possess a copy without encountering the license, then patent preemption might not be 
implicated.  See also discussion of Professor Jane Ginsburg scenario supra accompanying note 165. 
203 Cf.,  Maureen A. O’Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case:  A Market-Based Approach,
12 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 53 (1997);  see also, Miller, supra note 77. 
204 350 F. 3d 640, 641-42 (7th Cir. 2003) (where licensor sought to use mass market license and copyright 
to prevent licensees from disclosing to realtors real property tax assessment data collected and organized 
using the software and  not otherwise available, Posner J. strongly suggested that copyright misuse might 
bar enforcement;  he characterized the case as “about the attempt of a copyright owner to use copyright law 
to block access to data that not only are neither copyrightable nor copyrighted, but were not created or 
obtained by the copyright owner; the owner is trying to secrete the data in its copyrighted program-a 
program the existence of which reduced the likelihood that the data would be retained in a form in which 
they would have been readily accessible.”  He also noted:  “It would be appalling if such an attempt could 
succeed.” Id. at 642.).  In upholding an attorney fee award in the case, 361 F.3d 434, 437 (7th Cir. 2004), 
 Posner J. described it as a case where “[t]he plaintiff was rather transparently seeking to annex a portion of 
the intellectual public domain.”) 
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The unfortunate result is an apparent realignment of public policy in favor of a 
technology distributor who elects to introduce its technology to the mass market under a 
license.  It enables the technologist, without any federal IP rights in its IO, to assert 
exclusivity “against the world” to that information.  This would appear to lie at the heart 
of the patent regime.   
As discussed below, recent copyright decisions unequivocally reflect that patent 
law has primacy in the area of control of IO.  In addition, recent Congressional action in 
amending the Copyright Act expresses a federal policy in favor of RE of technical 
protections of copyrighted works where necessary to develop an independent 
interoperable product.  Cumulatively, these teachings indicate that recent cases have too 
readily enforced mass market license terms prohibiting RE, regardless of purpose.  This 
is inconsistent with repeated cautions from the Supreme Court to be mindful that patent is 
the proper form of IP for useful inventions.205 
Part IV: Federal Copyright Law on Discovery and Use of Interoperability 
Information 
 
A. Fair Use Decisions and the Primacy of Patent Law  
 
Recent copyright fair use decisions support RE for interoperability.206 Copyright 
decisions have recognized that RE of software to learn necessary interface information to 
develop independent programs which can interoperate with the targeted software or with 
another product that is compatible with the closed technologist’s product is fair use.207 
Thus courts have held that copying of interface information—whether directly used by 
end users208 or indirectly by allowing a program to interoperate with another program209-- 
is defensible and may excuse intermediate infringement of a software program.  The 
underlying rationale is that copyright does not protect ideas, processes, data formats and 
 
205 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954). 
206 Federal trademark policy also values product compatibility over enforcement of trademark rights.  See 
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (competitor’s use of Sega’s 
trademark as part of initialization process lawful because Sega elected to use it’s trademark functionally as 
part of its trademark security system even where it resulted in confusing mislabeling of competitor’s 
product); see also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 15 (1995) (color compatibility of 
products as form of functionality outside role of trademark policy). 
207 See Sony Computer Entm’t v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000); Bateman v. Mnemonics, 
Inc., 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996). 
208 See Lotus v. Borland Int’l., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d, 516 U.S. 233 (1996) (copyright in 
software cannot be used to prevent another party from using keystroke commands which are the method of 
operation by which a human interfaces with the program) (majority decision was that keystroke commands 
were uncopyrightable “methods of operation” under §102(b) of the Copyright Act as contrasted with 
Justice Boudin’s concurrence which came to same conclusion by a fair use analysis) (U.S. Supreme Court 
affirmance was equally divided). 
209 See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1992);  Sony Computer Entm’t v. 
Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000); NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 1188-89 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (no 
copyright infringement of Intel’s microcode where “the expression of NEC's microcode was constrained by 
the use of the macroinstruction set and hardware of the 8086/88”). 
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methods of operation210 and as such it is fair for a competitor to do an act that would 
otherwise be copyright infringement (decompiling or disassembling a software program) 
to ascertain the IO needed to build an independent interoperable program.211 
The outcome in these cases relating to access and use of IO is consistent with the 
fundamental teaching of Baker v. Selden212: although a party can acquire a copyright in a 
work which embodies creative expression, that right cannot interfere with the right to 
practice the useful art or method of operation embodied in the work which is the province 
of patent law.  Thus in Baker, the Supreme Court determined that copyright would not 
extend to foreclose use of a form embodied in a copyright work necessary to practice a 
bookkeeping method.  The Court reasoned that the ability to control the practice of a 
method of operation was the province of patent, not copyright: 
 
To give to the author of the book an exclusive property in the art described 
therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been officially made, 
would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public.  That is the province of 
letters-patent, not of copyright.  The claim to an invention or discovery of 
an art or manufacture must be subjected to the examination of the Patent 
Office before an exclusive right therein can be obtained; and it can only be 
secured by a patent from the government.213 
A review of the key copyright cases involving RE to discover and use IO shows 
consistent support for this principle.  This underlying tenet of the primary place of the 
regime of patent, not copyright, in connection with the right to use functional matter 
(such as a format—the software equivalent to the form in Baker) should inform the 
 
210 See Computer Assocs. Int’l Inc. v. Altai Inc., 23 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1241, 1251 (2d Cir. 1992); 17 U.S.C. 
§102(b) (2001); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 836 n.3 (10th Cir. 1993) 
(command codes are method of operation not subject to copyright protection); Lotus, 49 F.3d  (majority no; 
Boudin J. concurrence opines fair use determines scope of protection); Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 
1366, 1376 (10th Cir. 1997) (command codes for accessing telephone device unprotected because they 
were scenes a faire “dictated by external functionality and compatibility requirements of the computer and 
telecommunications industries.”)  
211 One interesting issue which remains the subject of some controversy is whether an interface or protocol 
is itself copyrightable.  Decisions have not been consistent on the copyrightability of interfaces.  Cf. Lotus, 
49 F.3d (majority no copyright in keystroke commands because they were “method of operation”; Boudin J. 
concurrence opines fair use determines scope of protection); Bateman, 79 F.3d at 1547 (“It is an incorrect 
statement of the law that interface specifications are not copyrightable as a matter of law.”); Altai, 23 
U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1251 (analyzed under scenes a fair/what is necessary incident), discussed infra text 
accompanying note 221; Cf. American Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans, 126 F. 977 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(taxonomy of insurance billing codes copyrightable, and potentially single five-digit number within 
taxonomy may be copyrightable expression).  See also Mark A. Lemley, TITLE at  n.24.  Drawing an 
analogy to the law relating to copyright protection of forms, copyrightability needs to be assessed on a case 
by case basis to determine if there is expressive material beyond what is necessary to implement/use the 
interface or protocol.  In contrast, interfaces are not protected by copyright under the European Union 
Software Directive (“Whereas, for the avoidance of doubt, it has to be made clear that only the expression 
of a computer program is protected and that ideas and principles which underlie any element of a program, 
including those which underlie its interfaces, are not protected by copyright under this Directive.”) Council 
Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs, Whereas cl. 13. 
212 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
213 Id.
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analysis of whether patent or copyright principles should govern the question of 
preemption of state contract terms which bar discovery and use of IO.214 
Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc.215 was the first case to hold that RE of software to 
discover and use IO is a fair use.  The Ninth Circuit held that Accolade’s disassembly of 
Sega’s machine readable object code (which was publicly available) into human-readable 
source code was permissible to identify the information necessary for Accolade to 
develop an independent game program that would be compatible with the Sega Genesis 
game platform.   
 
In order to discover the interface information, Accolade copied and made a 
derivative of the Sega object code, both of which acts prima facie fall within the 
exclusive rights of a copyright holder.  However, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
Accolade’s disassembly was a fair use under Section 107 of the Copyright Act: 
 
Because, in the case before us, disassembly is the only means of gaining 
access to those unprotected aspects of the program, and because Accolade 
has a legitimate interest in gaining such access (in order to determine how 
to make its cartridges compatible with the Genesis console), we agree with 
Accolade’s [fair use assertion].216 
The Sega court recognized that a contrary ruling would amount to an 
unacceptable “de facto monopoly” on IO by reliance on copyright law: 
 
[T]he fact that computer programs are distributed for public use in object 
code form often precludes public access to the ideas and functional 
concepts contained in those programs, and thus confers on the copyright 
owner a de facto monopoly over those ideas and functional concepts. That 
result defeats the fundamental purpose of the Copyright Act – to 
encourage the production of original works by protecting the expressive 
elements of those works while leaving the ideas, facts, and functional 
concepts in the public domain for others to build on. Feist Publications,
111 S. Ct. at 1290 ; see also Atari Games Corp., slip op. at 18-20 .217 
A review of this reasoning suggests that the court’s logic is partially correct:  
enforcing such a copyright claim would confer a “de facto monopoly over 
[interoperabilty] ideas and functional concepts.”  However, fundamentally it is the patent 
primacy teaching of Baker (which underlies section 102(b) of the Copyright Act) which 
dictates the outcome.  Thus, it is inappropriate to assert copyright in a work to prevent 
 
214 Early in the debate about the role of patent and copyright protection of software, commentators 
recognized that the primacy of patent over copyright as to functional aspects of software was important to 
consider from a preemption perspective.  See McManis, supra note 13, at 95 (citing D.C. Toedt, Bonito 
Boats, and Primacy of the Patent System – Are There Implications for Software Copyrights? COMPUTER 
LAW., Jan. 1989, at 12). 
215 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). 
216 Id. 
217 Id. at 1527. 
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another from practicing the useful art (i.e. the format or method for interoperation) by 
barring discovery and use of that which inheres in the work. 
Not surprisingly, in Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.,218 the 
Federal Circuit—the court most acutely familiar with the exclusive role of patents to 
address functional information219—found the attempted use of copyright law to bar 
discovery of IO conflicted with the exclusive domain of patent law because it created 
“patent-like protection”.  Relying on Bonito Boats (discussed in detail in Part III above), 
the Court stated: 
To protect processes or methods of operation, a creator must look to the 
patent laws.  An author cannot acquire patent-like protection by putting an 
idea, process or method of operation in an unintelligible form and 
asserting copyright infringement against those who try to understand that 
idea, process, or method of operation.220 
The Second Circuit in Computer Assocs. Int’l Inc. v. Altai Inc.,221 specifically 
addressed whether IO is protected by copyright by considering Baker v. Seldon222:
To the extent that an accounting text and a computer program are both  "a 
set of statements or instructions .  .  . to bring about a certain  result," 17 
U.S.C. Section  101, they are roughly analogous. In the former case, the 
processes are ultimately conducted by human agency; in the latter,  by 
electronic means. In either case, as already stated, the 
processes themselves are not protectable. But the holding in Baker goes 
farther. The Court concluded that those aspects of a work, which "must 
necessarily be used as incident to" the idea, system or process that the 
work describes, are also not copyrightable. 101 U.S. at 104. 
Selden's ledger sheets, therefore, enjoyed no copyright protection because 
they were  "necessary incidents to" the system of accounting that he 
described.  Id . at 103. From this reasoning, we conclude that those 
elements of a computer program that are necessarily incidental to its 
function are similarly unprotectable.223 
The Altai Court then proceeded to outline the now well-accepted 
abstraction/filtration/comparison test to determine non-literal infringement of the 
structure of a computer program.  The Court specifically identified “compatibility” 
requirements as the type of elements dictated by external factors which should not be 
protected by copyright and thus “filtered” out: 
 
218 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
219 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989) (noting the Congressional 
recognition of importance of “nationwide uniformity in patent law” in conferring Federal Circuit with 
exclusive jurisdiction of all patent appeals). 
220 Atari, 975 F.2d at 842. 
221 23 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1241, 1251 (2d Cir. 1992). 
222 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
223 Altai, 23 U.S.P.Q. 2d. 
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b) Elements Dictated By External Factors 
We have stated that where "it is virtually impossible to write about a 
particular historical era or fictional theme without employing 
certain 'stock' or standard literary devices," such expression is not 
copyrightable. . . . This is known as the scenes a faire doctrine, and like 
"merger," it has its analogous application to computer programs. . . . 
Professor Nimmer points out that "in many instances it is 
virtually impossible to write a program to perform particular functions in a 
specific computing environment without employing standard 
techniques." . . . This is a result of the fact that a programmer's freedom 
of  design choice is often circumscribed by extrinsic considerations such 
as (1)  the mechanical specifications of the computer on which a particular 
program is  intended to run; (2) compatibility requirements of other 
programs with which a  program is designated to operate in conjunction; 
(3) computer manufacturers'  design standards.224 
In affirming the district court’s finding of no infringement, the Second Circuit 
specifically applied the above compatibility constraint: 
The district court also found that the overlap exhibited between the list of 
services required for both ADAPTER [plaintiff’s program] and OSCAR 
3.5 [defendant’s allegedly infringing program] was "determinated [sic] 
by  the demands of the operating system and of the applications program 
to which  it [was] to be linked through ADAPTER or OSCAR." Id.  In 
other words, this aspect of the program's structure was dictated by  the 
nature of other programs with which it was designed to interact and, 
thus,  is not protected by copyright.225 
The Tenth Circuit decision in Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Indus.,226 also 
recognized the risk of extending copyright protection to prevent use of methods of 
interoperation in a section of the opinion entitled, “The Process-Expression Dichotomy”: 
Some concern has been expressed lest copyright in computer programs 
should extend protection to the methodology or processes adopted by the 
programmer, rather than merely to the “writing” expressing his ideas.  
Section 102(b) is intended, among other things, to make clear that the 
expression adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element in a 
computer program, and that the actual processes or methods embodied in 
the program are not within the scope of copyright law.227 
224 Id. at 1255. 
225 Id. at 1259-60. 
226 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993). 
227 Id.
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The Court discussed Baker and recognized that “[c]ertain processes may be the subject of 
patent law protection.”228 Presciently, the Tenth Circuit, in relying on Sega for the 
proposition that “compatibility requirements” are excluded from copyright protection by 
the scenes a faire doctrine, cautioned: 
We recognize that the scenes a faire doctrine may implicate the 
protectability of interfacing and that the topic is very sensitive and has the 
potential to effect widely the law of computer copyright.  This appeal does 
not require us to determine the scope of scenes a faire doctrine as it relates 
to interfacing and accordingly we refrain from discussing the issue.229 
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit decision in Bates v. Mnemonics,230 is significant 
because the court specifically identified patent and trade secret law, not copyright, as the 
appropriate legal regimes for protection of IO.  In rejecting a claim for copyright in a data 
format needed for telecommunication interoperation, the Court stated: 
 
In no case, however should copyright protection be extended to functional 
results obtained when program instructions are executed and such results 
are processes of the type better left to patent and trade secret protection.231 
Collectively, these cases support the proposition that copyright cannot be asserted 
to prevent RE to discover and use IO.  However, none of them address whether a contract 
term can override the right to RE to discover and use IO.   
 
The Fifth Circuit has encountered the conflict between copyright and contract.  In 
Alcatel U.S.A., Inc. v. DGI Techs., 232 the court upheld a jury finding that a contractual 
restriction on RE constituted copyright misuse.233 In an earlier appeal in this case, the 
Fifth Circuit used the same reasoning as Sega and Atari concerning impropriety of 
copyright assertion to obtain “a patent-like monopoly” without a patent to rule that 
copyright misuse might bar enforcement of a license: 
 
228 Id.
229 Id. at 838 n.14. 
230 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996) 
231 Id.
232 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999). 
233 See id. at 793; see also D.S.C. Commc’ns v. DGI Techs. Inc., 81 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1996).  However, 
other courts have rejected the copyright misuse defense.  See Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 
(8th Cir. 2005).  Although some have argued that copyright misuse would be the correct tool to apply to a 
shrink wrap provision restricting RE (see e.g.,  James A.D. White, Misuse or Fair Use:  That is the 
Software Copyright Question, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 251, 308 (1997), arguably it is too blunt an 
instrument because it leads a court to suspend any copyright assertion until the misuse is cured.  Given the 
uncertainty on this issue, arguably this is too draconian an outcome with regard to IO.  The enlightened 
contract interpretation, public policy and patent preemption analysis suggested in this article works better to 
address functional IO.  Interestingly, the application of the public policy rule to contract may also be better 
suited to address other concerns of terms which may conflict with other public policies.  See discussion of 
UCITA commentary, infra at Part V A (specifically mentioning free speech and concerns implicated in a 
non-negotiated mass market license context). 
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DGI may well prevail on the defense of copyright misuse, because DSC 
seems to be attempting to use its copyright to obtain a patent-like 
monopoly over unpatented microprocessor cards.   Any competing 
microprocessor card developed for use on DSC phone switches must be 
compatible with DSC's copyrighted operating system software.   In order 
to ensure that its card is compatible, a competitor such as DGI must test 
the card on a DSC phone switch.   Such a test necessarily involves making 
a copy of DSC's copyrighted operating system, which copy is downloaded 
into the card's memory when the card is booted up.   If DSC is allowed to 
prevent such copying, then it can prevent anyone from developing a 
competing microprocessor card, even though it has not patented the card. 
The defense of copyright misuse "forbids the use of the copyright to 
secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the 
Copyright Office," including a limited monopoly over microprocessor 
cards.   See Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 977.   Therefore, DGI's asserting the 
misuse defense could cast substantial doubt on the predictability of 
success by DSC. The First Circuit squarely came to this conclusion in 
Lotus v. Borland, where it held that the keystroke commands for human 
interoperating with the software was a method of operation within Section 
102(b) of the Copyright Act and thus not copyrightable. 234 
A broader understanding of these decisions demonstrates they are consistent with 
the general principle to channel protection of subject matter between patent and copyright, 
with the primacy of patent law for functional matters (i.e. useful arts).235 This is founded 
in the Intellectual Property clause in the Constitution which makes clear that inventors 
are incented with patents to promote progress in the useful arts and authors are incented 
by copyright to promote writings and other artistic/creative expressions.236 The net result 
is that patent law (not copyright law) has primacy in addressing protection of functional 
subject matter such as formats and methods for interoperation of computer software.237 
Arguably it is this teaching which was somehow lost in the recent cases where the 
propriety of contract to control discovery and use of IO has been considered solely from a 
mistaken focus on copyright law.   Since IO is functional in nature, the proper 
Constitutional focus should primarily be patent, not copyright, law.  Thus, patent, not 
copyright law, is the primary source of law at the federal level for protection of functional 
 
234 D.S.C. Commc’ns, 81 F.3d.  See also Assessment Techns. v. WIREDATA, Inc., 350 F. 3d 640, 641-42 
(7th Cir. 2003)(discussed supra at note 203). 
235 See e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954);  See also, Dennis S. Karjala & Peter S. Menell, Applying 
Fundamental Copyright Principles to Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc., 10 HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 177, 184-86 (1995). 
236 Patent provides a monopoly right that excludes competition even by an independent inventor in return 
for public disclosure of the invention.  To qualify for the exclusionary right over methods of operation and 
other functional ideas, patent law imposes a rigorous threshold of novelty and nonobvious.  In contrast, 
copyright has the low originality standard for protection but does not provide an exclusionary monopoly to 
practice any methods of operation or processes or functions.   
237 See McManis, supra note 13, at 95-99. 
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information.238 With this in mind, it becomes apparent that arguments about Copyright 
preemption of state regulation by contract of IO are at most secondary considerations:  
the appropriate question is whether state protection of IO by mass market license 
prohibitions on RE clashes with the patent regime established under the Intellectual 
Property Clause of the Constitution. 
 
Nonetheless, the above cases cumulatively reflect an underlying federal policy 
supporting RE to enable the development of interoperable software even where there may 
be potential adverse market effects on the original technologist. This same policy is 
embodied in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.   
 
B. Section 1201(f) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
 
In 1998, Congress enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).  
Section 1201 of the DMCA establishes new causes of action against persons who either 
circumvent a technological measure which protects a copyrighted work or manufacture, 
import, offer to the public, or traffic in any technology or component that is primarily 
designed to circumvent such a technological measure.239 In essence, Section 1201 claims 
amount to a federal rule against reverse engineering technological protection of 
copyrighted works. 
 
Congress created an exception to these new section 1201 claims where a party 
engages in RE for purposes of discovery and use of IO to develop an independent 
interoperable product.240 The legislative history makes clear that “[t]he purpose of this 
[exception] is to foster competition and innovation in the computer and software 
industry.”241 Section 1201(f)(1) of the DMCA provides a defense to a claim that a person 
has circumvented technical protection of a copyrighted work to develop an interoperable 
 
238 One implication of this change in focus from copyright to patent is that application of fair use will not be 
material—i.e., the Baker patent primacy principle does not require a court to consider the impact on the 
market for the underlying software to determine if the use is permissible.  Cf. Sony Computer Entm’t v. 
Connectix Corp., 203 F. 3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000) (where the court had to consider the potential harm to the 
market for Sony’s work).  Since Baker teaches that copyright law cannot be used to effect a patent on the 
useful art, surely the fact that there is increased competition relating to interoperable products will not risk 
loss of a privilege for RE (whereas that is a factor if the copyright lens, with its fair use factors, is 
applicable).  Arguably, a way to reconcile this potential harm under copyright law would be akin to the 
proposition with parody—the mere fact that a biting criticism (an effective interoperable product) may 
adversely affect the market for the underlying work is not a legally cognizable harm.  See Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994).  
239 See 17 U.S.C. §1201 (2001). 
240 Recent decisions interpreting the application of section 1201 reflect a concern about parties improperly 
asserting section 1201 violations to prevent competition in after-market interoperable products.  See, e.g., 
Lexmark Int’l Inc. v. Static Control Components Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004) (replacement printer 
cartridges); Chamberlain v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (replacement 
garage door opener handheld device).  See generally, Raymond T. Nimmer, DMCA Overview, 842 
PLI/Pat55 (2005). 
241 S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 13 (1998), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
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program and 1201(f)(2) provides a defense where a person develops and employs a tool 
to circumvent for purposes of interoperability. 242 Section 1201(f)(1) states: 
 
a person who has lawfully obtained the right to use a copy of a computer 
program may circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls 
access to a particular portion of that program for the sole purpose of 
identifying and analyzing those elements of the program that are necessary 
to achieve interoperability of an independently created computer program 
with other programs, and that have not previously been readily available to 
the person engaging in the circumvention, to the extent any such acts of 
identification and analysis do not constitute infringement under this 
title.243 
Section 1201(f)(3) provides: 
 
The information acquired through the acts permitted under paragraph (1), 
and the means permitted under paragraph (2), may be made available to 
others if the person referred to in paragraph (1) or (2), as the case may be, 
provides such information or means solely for the purpose of enabling IO 
of an independently created computer program with other programs, and 
to the extent that doing so does not constitute infringement under this title 
or violate applicable law other than this section.244 
There is some ambiguity about what 1201(f)(3) addresses.245 One interpretation 
is that it covers the scenario where a developer outsources to a third party the RE to 
discover IO.  A second interpretation is that it addresses the issue of whether an 
interoperability developer is free to distribute a product which includes IO obtained by 
the means and tools of 1201(f)(1) and (2).246 Regardless of the interpretation, 1201(f)(3) 
requires that the acts of identification and analysis neither (1) constitute copyright 
 
242 The requirements of the two subsections are: (1) lawfully obtaining the right to use a copy of the 
program; (2) circumventing a particular portion; (3) solely to identify and analyze elements; (4) not 
previously readily available to the reverse engineer; (5) necessary to achieve IO of (6) an independently 
created program with (7) other programs; and (8) provided the acts of identification and analysis do not 
constitute copyright infringement. Whereas subsections 1201(f)(1)-(2) are limited solely to “acts of 
identification and analysis [which] do not constitute infringement under [the Copyright Act],” (f)(3) also 
requires that the identification and analysis not “violate applicable law other than this section.”  17 U.S.C. 
§1201(f)(1), -(3) (2001). 
243 Id. §1201(f)(1). 
244 Id. §1201(f)(3). 
245 I would like to thank Professor Ginsburg for suggesting that I discuss this issue. 
246 One reason why this author believes the former interpretation is more persuasive is that depending upon 
the particular interoperability method, the interoperable product may not necessarily “make available to 
others” the IO but rather merely embody the fruits of development using such information.  It would not 
seem logical for Congress to have sought to differentiate interoperable products which must distribute IO as 
contrasted with other interoperable products which solely were developed through use of such IO, but do 
not need to include it. 
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infringement (which is also required if the work is done in-house) nor (2) violate 
“applicable law”.   
 
There is no detailed language in Section 1201 which provides that a contract term 
restricting RE is invalid.  However, a comparison of the particular wording of subsections 
1201(f)(1) and (f)(2) with  subsection 1201(f)(3) and the exceptions for encryption 
research (1201(g)), protection of personally identifiable information (1201(i)), and 
security research (1201(j) may bear on the question of supremacy of federal 
interoperability policy vis a vis enforcement of a contract term to the contrary.  Although 
all three 1201(f) subsections require that “any such acts of identification and analysis . . . 
not constitute [copyright] infringement,” only (f)(3) adds the requirement that other 
“applicable law” not be violated.247 Likewise, the encryption research, protection of 
personally identifiable information and security testing sections require that either 
“applicable law” or “other law” not be violated. 
 
“Applicable law” is not defined in the statute.  There are a number of possible 
interpretations of the 1201(f) exceptions on the question of preemption of contrary 
contract terms. 248 One is that “applicable law” solely refers to statutory and regulatory 
law.249 A second interpretation is that “applicable law” includes contract law, but the 
omission of “applicable law” from 1201(f)(1) and (2) merely reflects Congressional 
intent that a defense will not be lost under those subsections where the RE violates a 
contract.  As such, the RE is lawful under 1201, but that leaves contract law enforceable.  
A third interpretation is that “applicable law” includes contract law and the absence of 
this requirement in 1201(f)(1) and (2) preempts an inconsistent contract term, as a matter 
of either implicit preemption or conflict preemption.  The point is that if a court were to 
enforce a contract restriction notwithstanding 1201(f)(1) and (2), the purpose of Congress 
to foster interoperability would be frustrated.   
 
In interpreting the statute, arguably construing (f)(3) as addressing solely the 
outsourcing of RE may be the most plausible if one is trying to minimize the situations 
where preemption of contract law may occur.  The point is that the absence of the 
requirement to comply with applicable law in (f)(1) and (2) to qualify for the RE 
exception to a circumvention claim arguably indicates a Congressional intent that federal 
policy favoring RE for interoperability is more important than enforcing a contractual 
restriction on such activity and therefore conflict preemption is required as to an 
 
247 Interestingly, section 1201 uses different language for different exceptions:  protection of personally 
identifying information under section 1201(i) must not be “ in violation of any other law”;  security testing 
under 1201(j) must “not constitute infringement under this title or a violation of applicable law other than 
this section, including section 1030 of title 18 and those provisions of title 18 amended by the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986.”;  encryption research under 1201(g) must “not constitute infringement 
under this title or a violation of applicable law other than this section, including section 1030 of title 18 and 
those provisions of title 18 amended by the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986.” 
248 Professor Ginsburg suggested the possibility that a mistake accounts for the absence of “applicable law” 
from 1201(f)(1)-(2). 
249 For example, this might cover the Atari scenario where defense counsel violated copyright rules in 
obtaining a copy of plaintiff’s work deposited with the library of Congress.  See Atari Games Corp. v. 
Nintendo of America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
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inconsistent license term.  The basis for the distinction in treatment under (f)(1) and (f)(2) 
as contrasted with (f)(3) is to place greater constraints on a third party who is hired to 
undertake RE.  Where such a third party is involved, contract law could restrict any such 
RE.  Arguably this reflects a Congressional concern that outsourcing sensitive RE is 
disfavored in the law. 250 
Unfortunately, the legislative history on this provision is silent on the relationship 
between the statute and contract terms purporting to restrict RE.  However, the House 
Report is clear on the federal policy of promoting interoperabilitiy of software programs: 
 
Section 1201(f) is intended to promote reverse engineering by permitting 
the circumvention of access control technologies for the sole purpose of 
achieving software interoperability.  Section 102(f)(1) permits the act of 
circumvention in only certain instances.  To begin with, the copy of the 
computer program which is the subject of the analysis must be lawfully 
acquired (i.e., the computer program must be acquired from a legitimate 
source, along with any necessary serial codes, passwords, or other such 
means as may be necessary to be able to use the program as it was 
designed to be used by a consumer of the product).  In addition, the acts 
must be limited to those elements of the program which must be analyzed 
to achieve interoperability of an independently created program with other 
programs.  The resulting product must also be a new and original work, in 
that it may not infringe the original computer program.  Moreover, the 
objective of the analysis must be to achieve interoperability which are not 
otherwise available to the person.  Finally, the goal of this section is to 
ensure that current law is not changed, and not to encourage or permit 
infringement.  Thus, each of the acts undertaken must avoid infringing the 
copyright of the author of the underlying computer program.251 
In sum, Congress recognized the importance of RE to discover and use IO.  In 
addition, a close reading of the particular language used by Congress suggests that 
Section 1201 (f)(1) and (2) may preempt252 state contract law to the extent a contract term 
prohibits a party from RE solely for the purpose of developing an interoperable product 
in instances where a party internally undertakes the necessary RE because such a term 
frustrates the purpose of Section 1201(f). 
 
Cumulatively, the fair use decisions and Section 1201(f) reflect a federal policy in 
favor of RE for purposes of discovery and use of IO where the information is needed to 
 
250 If that is the case, it simply provides further support for why the current regulation competition among 
the states and foreign jurisdictions on the enforceability of contract restrictions on RE is contrary to federal 
patent law and policy against such regulatory competition, particularly where, as here, the net effect may 
contradict federal patent interests because parties may outsource such activity internationally and thereby 
benefit industry in foreign jurisdictions at the expense of the U.S. economy.  See discussion infra Part VI. 
251 House Report, Committee on Commerce, Rept. 105-551, Part 2, at p. 42. 
252 This is a case of “explicit” preemption because Congress implies in the structure and purpose of section 
1201(f) that federal law will preempt state law.  See ROBERT A. GORMAN AND JANE C. GINSBURG,
COPYRIGHT 902 (6th ed. 2002). 
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develop an interoperable independent program.253 In addition, the federal interest is so 
strong that arguably Congress has preempted contract terms to the contrary where a 
company circumvents technological protection of a copyrighted work in-house so that it 
can develop an interoperable product.   
 
For the reasons discussed in Part III and reinforced in the copyright fair use cases 
discussed above, the debate in the courts and the literature has been misplaced in 
focusing primarily on whether the above articulated federal copyright policy supporting 
interoperability requires preemption of enforcement of a mass market license term to the 
contrary by virtue of Section 301 of the Copyright Act or a copyright conflicts theory.254 
With the exception of one Circuit,255 the trend of the courts is that RE prohibitions in 
mass market licenses are not preempted.256 
For the reasons discussed in this article, scrutiny of patent and trade secret law 
provides the proper lens for considering the propriety of enforcing state contract law 
restrictions on RE to discover IO.  However, patent preemption is not the sole—and in 
fact should be the last—resort for any court considering the enforceability of a non-
negotiated mass market license restriction on RE for purposes of interoperability.  For 
that reason, public policy exceptions to contract law need to be reviewed. 
 
Part V. Public Policy Exception to Contract Law:  Balancing Federal 
Interoperability Policy, Trade Secret and Contract Interests   
 
A. Public Policy Exception to Contract Law 
 
In addition to the compelling patent preemption basis for invalidating certain non-
negotiated mass market license terms which prohibit RE for interoperability purposes, a 
review of state contract law principles also supports invalidation.  It is well established 
law that public policy may outweigh freedom of contract.257 
253 Federal policy in favor of RE is also codified as an exception to the scope of protection of 
semiconductor chip products.  The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 excuses RE of a 
semiconductor chip where the party “reproduce[s] the mask work solely for the purpose of teaching, 
analyzing, or evaluating the concepts or techniques embodied in the mask work or the circuitry, logic flow, 
or organization of components used in the mask work; or . . . incorporates the results of such conduct in an 
original mask work. . . .”  17 U.S.C. §904 (2001).  
 
254 See e.g.,  commentators listed supra note 67. 
255 See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 775 F.2d 638 (5th Cir.1985); see also Gates Rubber Co. v. 
Bando Chemical Indus., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that contract was not preempted by copyright 
because there was an extra element in the form of a relationship between the parties). 
256 See discussion of cases infra Part IV.D.  Note that most of the copyright preemption debate has focused 
on section 301, rather than a general conflict with copyright theory of preemption.  But see Brief for of 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 302 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (No. 91-40079)(Brief at p. 
14)(asserting copyright conflicts preemption). 
257 See Restatement (Second) Contracts (2002).  For general discussion of public policy limits on IP 
licensing, see Lemley, supra note 142, at 163-71; Reichman & Franklin, supra note 72, at 925-27; Mark A. 
Lemley, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 1599, 1610 (1990). 
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One key question is whether a mass market contract term can override the 
fundamental trade secret principle of freedom to RE a lawfully acquired, publicly 
available product.  The two times courts have considered anything close to this question, 
they have determined that an asserted obligation running with a publicly available 
product cannot override the freedom to RE.  In Chicago Lock, the Ninth Circuit held that 
“[i]mposing an obligation of nondisclosure on lock owners . . . would frustrate the intent 
of California courts to disallow protection to trade secrets discovered through ‘fair and 
honest means.’”   
 
In DVD Copy Control, Justice Moreno directly addressed the issue of the 
relationship of trade secret policy and contract law, and strongly suggested that a mass 
market restriction prohibiting RE would conflict with California trade secret law.258 
This same public policy contract override principle is embodied in section 105 of 
UCITA, now adopted as the law of Maryland and Virginia.259 
Under section 105(b) of UCITA, a contract term may be unenforceable if it 
“violates a fundamental public policy,” with particular emphasis on federal policy: 
 
(b) [Fundamental public policy controls.] If a term of a contract violates 
a fundamental public policy, the court may refuse to enforce the contract, 
enforce the remainder of the contract without the impermissible term, or 
limit the application of the impermissible term so as to avoid a result 
contrary to public policy, in each case to the extent that the interest in 
enforcement is clearly outweighed by a public policy against enforcement 
of the term.260 
Comment 3 to section 105 provides: 
3. Public Policy Invalidation. Contract terms may be unenforceable 
because of federal preemption under subsection (a) of this section or 
because they are unconscionable under Section 111. In addition, 
subsection (b) sets out the legal principle that terms may be unenforceable 
if they violate a fundamental public policy that clearly overrides the policy 
favoring enforcement of private transactions as between the parties. The 
principle that courts may invalidate a term of a contract on public policy 
 
258 See discussion supra at Part IV.C. 
259 In addition to section 105(b), section 118 specifically overrides terms prohibiting RE to discover the IO 
information necessary and otherwise unavailable to develop an independent interoperable program.  In 
essence, UCITA has indirectly adopted the European Union approach by following the approach in section 
1201(f) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.  Comment 4 to section 118 makes clear that this is the 
first time an express contract invalidation rule has been adopted on this issue.   
 
260 Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) §105(b) (2002), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/2002final.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2006). 
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grounds is recognized at common law and in the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 178 et. seq. See, e.g., Livingston v. Tapscott, 585 So. 2d 839 
(Ala. 1991); Occidental Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 293
N.W.2d 843 (Neb. 1980).261 
In addition the Comment notes that “[i]n light of the national and international 
integration of the digital economy, courts should be reluctant to invalidate terms based on 
purely local policies.”262 However, the Comment particularly identifies “innovation, 
competition, fair comment and fair use” as “[t]he offsetting public policies most likely to 
apply to transactions within this Act.”263 In addition, it notes that “contractual terms, 
particularly those arising from a context without negotiation, may be impermissible if 
they violate fundamental public policy.”264 
On the issue of balancing trade secret and contract law interests, the 
commentators noted the inherent tension: 
 
Trade secret law allows information to be transferred subject to 
considerable contractual limitations on disclosure which facilitates the 
exploitation and commercial application of new technology. On the other 
hand, trade secret law does not prohibit reverse engineering of lawfully 
acquired goods available on the open market. Striking the appropriate 
balance depends on a variety of contextual factors that can only be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis with an eye to national policies.265 
This is precisely the concern raised by Justice Moreno in DVD Copy Control discussed 
in Part III C above, where he indicates that a non-negotiated mass market consumer 
license term cannot override the trade secret policy of freedom to RE. 266 
The Comment also notes that federal copyright and patent laws should be 
considered as relevant fundamental public policy: 
[C]ourts also may look to federal copyright and patent laws for guidance 
on what types of limitations on the rights of owners of information 
ordinarily seem appropriate, recognizing, however, that private parties 
ordinarily have sound commercial reasons for contracting for limitations 
on use and that enforcing private ordering arrangements in itself reflects a 
fundamental public policy enacted throughout the Uniform Commercial 
Code and common law.267 
261 Id. §105 cmt. 3. 
262 Id. 
263 Id. 
264 Id. 
265 Id. 
266 See discussion supra Part IV.C. 
267 UCITA §105 cmt. 3. 
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The Comment then directly identifies RE as an area where courts will need to 
weigh competing policies: 
In part because of the transformations caused by digital information, many 
areas of public information policy are in flux and subject to extensive 
debate. In several instances these debates are conducted within the domain 
of copyright or patent laws, such as whether copying a copyrighted work 
for purposes of reverse engineering is an infringement. This Act does not 
address these issues of national intellectual property policy, but how they 
are resolved may be instructive to courts in applying this subsection. One 
national statement of policy on the relationship between reverse 
engineering, security testing, and copyright in digital information can be 
found at 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1999). It recognizes a policy not to prohibit 
some forms of reverse engineering . . . .This policy may or may not 
outweigh a contract term to the contrary. See Section 118 for provisions 
dealing with reverse engineering for purposes of interoperability and 
Official Comment 3 to that section. .  .  .  This subsection deals with 
policies that implicate the broader public interest and the balance between 
enforcing private transactions and the need to protect the public domain 
of information.268 
Arguably, UCITA and its Official Comment reflect general principles.  As such, courts in 
non-UCITA jurisdictions should find the analysis useful in weighing competing public 
policies.  Courts should also take heed of the Prefatory Note to the USTA concerning the 
balance between patent and trade secret policy.269 
In sum, there is a path for courts to find that federal patent and copyright law and 
policies, coupled with the fundamental trade secret law principle of the freedom to RE 
publicly available products cumulatively outweigh the general policy of freedom of 
contract in the case of a non-negotiated mass market contract term barring RE for 
interoperability purposes.  UCITA and its commentary are path breaking in the United 
States for expressly recognizing the potential adverse policy implications of enforcing 
mass market license terms which may be interpreted to restrict RE for purposes of 
interoperability. 
B. A Reasonable Contract Interpretation Path  
Cumulatively, there are strong public policy reasons why any mass market license 
term prohibiting RE should be invalidated solely to the extent that it bars RE for purposes 
of developing an interoperable product.  However, to avoid the difficult issue of deciding 
whether public policy requires invalidating a contract term, a preferred approach is for 
 
268 Id. 
269 See discussion supra Part II.E. 
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courts to interpret narrowly any clauses addressing RE to limit their application when 
properly viewed against the background of competing public policies.   
Such an approach would be supported by the doctrine of contra proferentum (i.e., 
any ambiguity in a contract should be construed against the drafter).270 The argument is 
that a reasonable drafter using the undefined phrase “reverse engineer” would be 
presumed to be aware of the federal copyright policies supporting RE for interoperability, 
the primacy of federal patent policies in regulating access to and use of IO, and the 
general trade secret principle of freedom to RE products generally available in the 
marketplace.  Since the phrase “reverse engineer” is ambiguous and could be construed 
either to be consistent with or antagonistic to these federal and state trade secret policies, 
the former interpretation should be employed.  This same approach can be reached if a 
court were to find that federal principles need to be applied to limit the scope of the 
contract term.271 
This approach does not preclude negotiation of a contract term restricting RE 
which includes prohibitions on the discovery and use IO.272 Rather, the proper analysis 
of such a clause is state court enforcement of statutory waivers.273 
With the above patent preemption, public policy invalidation, and contract 
interpretation analyses in mind, let’s return to a particular example of a closed platform in 
the marketplace. 
C. A Case Study:  Apple iTUNES 
Given the fact that courts have applied California law to restrict RE274 and that 
Apple is an example of a closed technologist275 where third parties and consumers have 
made clear a desire for interoperable products, iTunes presents a good case study for 
application of the approach suggested in this article. 
 
270 But see S.O.S. , Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting application of California 
rule of contra proferentum to copyright license where it would override proposition that copyright does not 
impliedly grant rights).  See also Lemley, supra note 142, at 161 (noting that “[o]ther cases . . . impose 
federal restrictions on contract terms in order to protect important aspects of federal policy”). 
271 See Lemley, supra note 142, at 161 n.232 (“federalism principles dictate that state rules of contractual 
construction cannot interfere with federal law or policy”)(quoting SQL Solutions, Inc. v. Oracle Corp., No. 
C-91-1079 MHP, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21097, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1991)). 
272 See discussion supra Part IV.C, text accompanying note 165. 
273 I would like to thank Annette L. Hurst for identifying this approach as potentially applicable to this issue. 
274 See Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005). 
275 Interestingly, Apple’s recent procurement of an interoperability related patent suggests that Apple 
realizes it is just a matter of time before the courts address this issue and determine that use of copyright, 
trade secret and mass market licenses will not afford protection of interoperability information for the 
reasons outlined in this Article. See e.g.,  Patent 6,871,349 covers a "method and apparatus for relaying 
events intended for a first application program to a second application program." David Akhond, Gregory 
Scown, and Johnathon Kaminar are listed as the inventors. The patent was filed September 29, 2000 and 
was awarded March 22, 2005. (reported in www.thinksecret.com  Apple Patent Watch March/April 2005,  
http://www.thinksecret.com/news/patents05may.html ) (last visited 2/16/06). 
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1. Contract Interpretation 
The Apple iTunes license276 is the starting place for the analysis: 
2. Permitted License Uses and Restrictions. This License allows you to 
install and use the Apple Software. The Apple Software may be used to 
reproduce materials so long as such use is limited to reproduction of non-
copyrighted materials, materials in which you own the copyright, or 
materials you are authorized or legally permitted to reproduce. You may 
not make the Apple Software available over a network where it could be 
used by multiple computers at the same time. You may make one copy of 
the Apple Software in machine-readable form for backup purposes only; 
provided that the backup copy must include all copyright or other 
proprietary notices contained on the original. Except as and only to the 
extent expressly permitted in this License or by applicable law, you may 
not copy, decompile, reverse engineer, disassemble, modify, or create 
derivative works of the Apple Software or any part thereof . . . 277 
Arguably a reasonable interpretation of the language, “[e]xcept as . . . expressly 
permitted . . . by applicable law” should include consideration of the California Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act.  Section 3426.1 (a) of the Act expressly states, “[r]everse 
engineering . . . alone shall not be considered improper means.”  The reasoning of the 
California Supreme Court in Cadence Design Systems, Inc. v. Avant! Corp.278and of 
Justice Moreno in DVD Copy Control279 coupled with the analysis of the Ninth Circuit in 
Chicago Lock280 all support the proposition that California contract law must be read in a 
manner consistent with California trade secrets law.   
Accordingly, the express proviso in Paragraph 2 of the iTUNES license should be 
read to permit RE for interoperability purposes, particularly when other federal public 
policies favoring interoperability are considered.  However, if a court were to interpret 
the clause to cover RE for interoperability purposes, a contract public policy analysis 
should lead to invalidation. 
2. Contract Public Policy Analysis:  California Law – Balancing 
Competing Trade Secret, Federal Patent and Copyright Laws 
with Freedom of Contract Policies 
No California court (or federal court applying California law) has expressly ruled 
on the issue of whether the public policies embodied in federal copyright and patent law 
favoring RE solely for interoperability purposes and California trade secret law override 
 
276 Apple Computer, Inc. iTunes Software License Agreement, http://www.apple.com/legal/sla/itunes.html 
(last visited Dec. 22, 2005). 
277 Most vendors include language similar to Apple. 
278 29 Cal. 4th 215, 219-20 (2002).  See also discussion infra Part V.C.2. 
279 31 Cal. 4th 864 (2003).  See also discussion supra Part III.C.  
280 676 F.2d 400 (1982).  See also discussion supra Part III.C. 
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enforcement of a shrink or web wrap license prohibiting RE for purposes of discovery 
and use of IO to develop an independent interoperable product.281 A close analysis of 
one key amendment to the language of the UTSA as adopted by the California legislature 
provides support for the fundamental importance of freedom to RE as a limit on the scope 
of California state trade secret law.  Rather than satisfying itself with reference to RE as a 
“proper means” to acquire a trade secret in the Official Comment to the UTSA, the 
California Legislature modified the UTSA and added the following positive statement at 
the end of the definition of “improper means”:  “Reverse engineering or independent 
derivation alone shall not be considered improper means.”282 
In one of the leading California cases discussing California trade secret law, the 
California Supreme Court made clear that the freedom to RE a publicly available product 
codified in Section 3426.1 (a) of the California Trade Secret Acts was a fundamental 
distinction between trade secret protection and patent law: 
Thus, the legal protection accorded trade secrets is fundamentally different 
from that given to patents, in which the patent owner acquires a limited 
term monopoly over the patented technology, and use of that technology 
by whatever means infringes the patent. The owner of the trade secret is 
protected only against the appropriation of the secret by improper means 
and the subsequent use or disclosure of the improperly acquired secret. 
There are various legitimate means, such as reverse engineering, by which 
a trade secret can be acquired and used. (See 2 Callman, The Law of 
Unfair Competition, Trademarks, and Monopolies (1981) § 14.01, p. 14-6; 
id., § 14.15, p. 14-102.)283 
In addition, the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Chicago Lock supports the 
proposition that the freedom to RE a publicly available product is a fundamental public 
policy which underlies California law.284 Finally, Justice Moreno’s analysis in his 
concurrence in DVD Copy Control casts serious doubt on the enforceability, under 
California law, of a non-negotiated mass market license term barring RE for purposes of 
interoperability.285 
When viewed together with the general public policy analysis discussed in Part V 
A above, there appear to be very compelling reasons why the Apple RE restriction, if 
 
281 The issue was raised by IEEE-USA [Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.- USA] in an 
amicus brief filed with the Court of Appeal in DVD Copy Control. See Brief as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, 31 Cal. 4th 864 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2002) (brief at pp. 4-9).  However, IEEE-USA argued that any 
shrink wrap term restricting RE, regardless of purpose (whether to clone or to interoperate), was in 
violation of the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act.  For the reasons discussed in this article, this 
argument goes too far—there are both federal and general procompetitive reasons why such a clause should 
be enforceable except where it purports to prevent discovery and use of IO.  
282 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3426.1(b) (2005). 
283 Cadence Design Systems, 29 Cal. 4th at 221. 
284 Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1982).  See discussion supra Part III.C. 
285 See discussion supra Part III.C. 
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somehow interpreted to preclude RE for purposes of developing an interoperable product, 
should be invalidated as a matter of public policy.   
3. Patent Preemption 
If for some reason a public policy invalidation were not applied, then the patent 
preemption analysis presented in this article provides a strong case for preemption.   
Otherwise, Apple would have a reasonable alternative to patent protection under the 
guise of a non-negotiated mass market contract-enforced trade secret providing nation-
wide rights. 
Ironically, if courts interpret the Apple mass market license clause broadly to 
preclude RE for interoperability and proceed to enforce the clause notwithstanding 
competing public policy and patent preemption claims, Apple’s competitors very well 
may be incented to conduct RE activities directed toward interoperability in jurisdictions 
whose policies favor interoperability over contract.  In fact, the mere presence of such 
legally untested terms in a license may have a chilling effect on U.S.-based development 
and incent developers to move offshore.  It is precisely that result which highlights yet 
another reason why state regulatory competition in protection of IO clashes with federal 
patent and copyright policies. 
Part VI. The International Landscape 
While the contract/interoperability debate continues in the U.S., an increasing 
number of critical foreign jurisdictions are adopting a policy that interoperability 
overrides contract terms to the contrary.  This development is significant on several 
levels:  (1) it reflects different public policy approaches; (2) it sheds light on the potential 
dissonance between recent U.S. state contract law decisions upholding RE prohibitions 
and foreign rules overriding contract terms in favor of interoperability policy; and (3) it 
provides a clear example of IP rule arbitrage286 which is but one type of jurisdictional 
rule competition287.
Considered in this light, the trend in a number of significant foreign jurisdictions 
is to favor interoperability over freedom of contract in their jurisdiction (consistent with 
the Kewanee and Bonito Boats analysis in Part III C above) and to encourage investment 
in interoperability-related research and development in their jurisdiction, arguably at the 
expense of the United States.288 
As a starting point, the EU Directive on Software Protection was pioneering in 
expressly addressing the policy conflict between enforcing contract terms and 
encouraging interoperable software.  Article 6 makes clear that contract terms prohibiting 
 
286 See Intellectual Property Arbitrage, supra note 57. 
287 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION: PERSPECTIVES ON 
ECONOMIC REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (William W. Bratton et al. eds., 1996).  My 
thanks to Professor Jane Winn for raising this point. 
288 See Intellectual Property Arbitrage, supra note 57. 
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RE are invalid where a lawful possessor needs to decompile a software program to 
ascertain information necessary to and not otherwise available to achieve 
interoperabilty.289 
A review of a number of key industrial and developing countries reveals that the 
European Union,290 Australia,291 China,292 India,293 and Indonesia,294 all have laws 
whereby a contract term restricting RE for purposes of developing an independent 
interoperable program is unenforceable.  Two different doctrinal approaches lead to this 
result.  Some jurisdictions have adopted some form of Article 6 of European Directive.  
The second approach is application of a “public policy” exception to contract 
enforcement and recognition that copyright policy permits RE to discover and use IO to 
develop an independent interoperable product.  China, India and Indonesia are examples 
of this second approach.   
 
289 Article 6 provides:  
Article 6 Decompilation 
1. The authorization of the rightholder shall not be required where reproduction of the 
code and translation of its form within the meaning of Article 4 (a) and (b) are 
indispensable to obtain the information necessary to achieve the interoperability of an 
independently created computer program with other programs, provided that the 
following conditions are met: 
(a) these acts are performed by the licensee or by another person having a right to use a 
copy of a program, or on their behalf by a person authorized to to so; 
(b) the information necessary to achieve interoperability has not previously been readily 
available to the persons referred to in subparagraph (a); and 
(c) these acts are confined to the parts of the original program which are necessary to 
achieve interoperability. 
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not permit the information obtained through its 
application: 
(a) to be used for goals other than to achieve the interoperability of the independently 
created computer program; 
(b) to be given to others, except when necessary for the interoperability of the 
independently created computer program; or 
(c) to be used for the development, production or marketing of a computer program 
substantially similar in its expression, or for any other act which infringes copyright. 
3. In accordance with the provisions of the Berne Convention for the protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works, the provisions of this Article may not be interpreted in such 
a way as to allow its application to be used in a manner which unreasonably prejudices 
the right holder's legitimate interests or conflicts with a normal exploitation of the 
computer program. 
Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs. 
290 Id.
291 Australia Copyright Act 1968, amended by Copyright Amendment (Computer Programs) Act of 1999, § 
47H (expressly provides that a provision in an agreement that excludes or limits the operation of the 
operations of new exceptions relating to RE have no effect). 
292 § 4, Art. 22(1); § 52A(5) Contract Law. (available in English at: 
http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/laws/laws2-3.htm) (last visited 2/16/06).  
293 Art. 15, U.U.H.C. (RE for interoperability permitted); Art. 38C(1), U.U.H.C. (prohibits license contracts 
with provisions that may have harmful effects on Indonesian economy). 
294 
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Regardless of the doctrinal approach adopted, the point is an increasing number of 
critical countries with growing technology industries allow RE for interoperability 
purposes notwithstanding a contract term to the contrary.  The net result is that an IO 
developer may be incented to outsource interoperability related development to one of 
these countries, at the expense of U.S. industry.295 
Part VII. Conclusion 
 
Inherent in the Intellectual Property clause of the Constitution is the primacy of 
the patent regime to provide incentives to create useful arts.  For this reason, courts, as 
early as Baker, have held that copyright cannot be used as an instrument to effect a 
“patent-like monopoly” on the format for data entry necessary to practice a useful art.  In 
the computer era, this teaching is reflected in recent cases holding that copyright in 
software cannot be used as an instrument to protect the data formats and other functional 
information which inheres in a program and is necessary for interoperation with another 
computer program. 
 
Notwithstanding this primacy of patent law to protect IO, courts and 
commentators have mistakenly focused on copyright principles to determine the propriety 
of state contract law (shrink and web wrap licenses) as an instrument to control discovery 
and use of such information.  However, patent preemption, trade secret and general 
contract principles provide the correct lens for considering the enforceability of such 
license restrictions.  The Supreme Court decisions in Kewanee and Bonito Boats are clear 
that if state regulation of information is not weaker than patent law and in effect 
competes with patent protection and its limited term, it must be preempted.   
 
A careful analysis of mass market license terms restricting discovery and use of 
IO for purposes of developing an interoperable product appears to fail the test because a 
technologist may elect state protection by use of contract law to protect IO rather than 
obtain a patent.  Furthermore, there is serious regulatory competition as evidenced by 
rulings of the Seventh, Eighth, and Federal Circuits which could be interpreted as 
 
295 See e.g., Ann Harrison, Battle Brews Over Reverse Engineering, (May 8, 2000) (available at 
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/05/08/reverse.engineering.idg/) (last visited January 18, 
2006)(“Meanwhile, some developers are moving their reverse-engineering projects offshore to avoid U.S. 
rules.”)  A key remaining question is whether the ultimate independently developed interoperable product 
can lawfully be imported (if developed outside the U.S.) and distributed in the U.S.  The issue requires a 
conflict of law analysis, which is beyond the scope of this Article. There are arguments that foreign law 
(such as Art. 6 of the EU Software Directive) would control and make it lawful to reverse engineer in a 
foreign country (e.g. in an EU country) notwithstanding a license prohibition, and that the licensor could 
not assert breach of contract for the subsequent distribution in the U.S. of an independently developed 
program that used the information lawfully obtained in Europe.  Suffice it to say, this is an open question 
and the mere potential that interoperability developers may pursue such international outsourcing highlights 
an ironic implication of enforcement of mass market terms restricting RE for interoperability purposes 
where interoperabilty is consistent with federal policies.  The irony is compounded if Congress has 
intended to limit the exception to a DMCA section 1201 claim to prevent outsourcing of RE of technical 
protection of a copyrighted work.  See discussion supra Part IV.B.  
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providing a basis for such state regulation by contract as contrasted with the Third and 
Fifth Circuits, and UCITA jurisdictions.  The net effect of this regulation competition is 
that interoperability developers may be incented to outsource research and development 
related to interoperability to one of the increasing number of key foreign jurisdictions 
with law consistent with federal policy that would override a contract term restricting RE 
to discover and use IO for purposes of developing an interoperable product. 
 
Enlightened courts can avoid this conflict by using classic contract interpretation 
tools to limit application of mass market clauses on RE to exclude IO discovered solely 
to develop an interoperable product.  In the rare case of an unavoidable conflict, courts 
can rely on traditional contract public policy doctrine to invalidate a term to the extent it 
impairs such activity.  Thus, it is only in the rare case where a court does not find either 
of these principles available will patent preemption be mandated. 
 
The centrality of interoperability in the computer, telecommunication and related 
industries cannot be taken lightly – ultimately whether such innovation is incented by U.S. 
law or parties are encouraged to outsource internationally that critical development has 
dramatic long term implications on U.S. industry and the economy.  Accordingly it is 
imperative that courts begin to address the issue of protection of IO in a clearer fashion, 
with proper reference to the delicate balance of incentives including the primacy of patent 
law and policy established by the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 
 
Finally, application of the patent preemption/public policy analysis outlined in 
this Article to any case where contract law leads to a de facto monopoly on useful data 
may perhaps be of even greater significance than the issue of interoperability, which is 
but one type of functional information.  Arguably this analysis provides a new lens to 
consider ProCD-type licenses which protect uncopyrightable useful data and suggests a 
limiting principle, beyond copyright, to address risks of monopolizing such data under 
the guise of contract law.  
 
